CVE-2026-46202 : Detail

CVE-2026-46202

5.5
/
Sedang
0.01%V4
2026-05-28
10h16 +00:00
Local
2026-06-10
17h18 +00:00
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Deskripsi CVE

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: appletb-kbd: run inactivity autodim from workqueues The autodim code in hid-appletb-kbd takes backlight_device->ops_lock via backlight_device_set_brightness() -> mutex_lock() from two different atomic contexts: * appletb_inactivity_timer() is a struct timer_list callback, so it runs in softirq context. Every expiry triggers BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:591 Call Trace: __might_resched __mutex_lock backlight_device_set_brightness appletb_inactivity_timer call_timer_fn run_timer_softirq * reset_inactivity_timer() is called from appletb_kbd_hid_event() and appletb_kbd_inp_event(). On real USB hardware these run in softirq/IRQ context (URB completion and input-event dispatch). When the Touch Bar has already been dimmed or turned off, the reset path calls backlight_device_set_brightness() directly to restore brightness, producing the same warning. Both call sites hit the same mutex_lock()-from-atomic bug. Fix them together by moving the blocking work onto the system workqueue: * Convert the inactivity timer from struct timer_list to struct delayed_work; the callback (appletb_inactivity_work) now runs in process context where mutex_lock() is legal. * Add a dedicated struct work_struct restore_brightness_work and have reset_inactivity_timer() schedule it instead of calling backlight_device_set_brightness() directly. Cancel both works synchronously during driver tear-down alongside the existing backlight reference drop. The semantics are unchanged (same delays, same state transitions on dim, turn-off and user activity); only the execution context of the sleeping call changes. The timer field and callback are renamed to match their new type; reset_inactivity_timer() keeps its name because it is invoked from input event paths that read naturally as "reset the inactivity timer".

Informasi CVE

Kelemahan Terkait

CWE-ID Nama Kelemahan Sumber
CWE Other Tidak ada informasi.

Metrik

Metrik Skor Tingkat keparahan CVSS Vektor Sumber
V3.1 5.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

nvd@nist.gov

EPSS

EPSS adalah model penilaian yang memprediksi kemungkinan suatu kerentanan dieksploitasi.

Skor EPSS

Model EPSS menghasilkan skor probabilitas antara 0 dan 1 (0 hingga 100%). Semakin tinggi skor, semakin besar probabilitas bahwa suatu kerentanan akan dieksploitasi.

Persentil EPSS

Persentil digunakan untuk meranking CVE berdasarkan skor EPSS mereka. Misalnya, CVE di persentil ke-95 berdasarkan skor EPSS-nya lebih mungkin dieksploitasi daripada 95% CVE lainnya. Dengan demikian, persentil digunakan untuk membandingkan skor EPSS suatu CVE dengan CVE lainnya.

Produk yang Disebutkan

Konfigurasi 0

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version Dari (termasuk) 6.15 Hingga (tidak termasuk) 6.18.32

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version Dari (termasuk) 6.19 Hingga (tidak termasuk) 7.0.9

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 7.1

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 7.1

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 7.1

Referensi