Deskripsi CVE

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: destroy topsrv workqueues before closing connections tipc_topsrv_stop() closed subscriber connections while the topology server's send and receive workqueues were still running. Socket callbacks and subscription events could then queue more work, and in-flight send/recv work could drop the last connection reference during the conn_idr walk. That race produced several teardown failures: refcount_t addition on 0 from conn_get() on a connection whose release was blocked on idr_lock, a subsequent use-after-free in tipc_conn_close(), queue_work() on an already destroyed workqueue from the listener data-ready callback, and an RCU stall in tipc_topsrv_exit_net() while the walk spun under idr_lock. Clear srv->listener under idr_lock so it acts as a shutdown flag, skip queue_work() once it is NULL, destroy the workqueues to flush in-flight work, and only then close the remaining connections. Refuse tipc_conn_lookup() after that flag is cleared, and drop idr_lock when the teardown walk finds no connection, so an in-flight subscription event cannot pin idr_in_use while the walk holds the lock. v3 supersedes the narrower in-thread diff Tung Quang Nguyen posted on 2026-09-23. It keeps his teardown order and adds the lookup refusal and the empty-idr unlock.

Informasi CVE

Metrik

Metrik	Skor	Tingkat keparahan	CVSS Vektor	Sumber
V3.1	7.8	HIGH	CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Informasi lebih lanjut Base: Exploitabilty Metrics The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Local The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities. Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Low Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. Low The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope Metrics The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. Unchanged An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact Metrics The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. High There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal Metrics The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental Metrics These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.	416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67