CVE-2024-53071 : 詳細

CVE-2024-53071

5.5
/
中
0.05%V4
2024-11-19
17h22 +00:00
Local
2025-10-01
20h17 +00:00
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CVE の説明

drm/panthor: Be stricter about IO mapping flags

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/panthor: Be stricter about IO mapping flags The current panthor_device_mmap_io() implementation has two issues: 1. For mapping DRM_PANTHOR_USER_FLUSH_ID_MMIO_OFFSET, panthor_device_mmap_io() bails if VM_WRITE is set, but does not clear VM_MAYWRITE. That means userspace can use mprotect() to make the mapping writable later on. This is a classic Linux driver gotcha. I don't think this actually has any impact in practice: When the GPU is powered, writes to the FLUSH_ID seem to be ignored; and when the GPU is not powered, the dummy_latest_flush page provided by the driver is deliberately designed to not do any flushes, so the only thing writing to the dummy_latest_flush could achieve would be to make *more* flushes happen. 2. panthor_device_mmap_io() does not block MAP_PRIVATE mappings (which are mappings without the VM_SHARED flag). MAP_PRIVATE in combination with VM_MAYWRITE indicates that the VMA has copy-on-write semantics, which for VM_PFNMAP are semi-supported but fairly cursed. In particular, in such a mapping, the driver can only install PTEs during mmap() by calling remap_pfn_range() (because remap_pfn_range() wants to **store the physical address of the mapped physical memory into the vm_pgoff of the VMA**); installing PTEs later on with a fault handler (as panthor does) is not supported in private mappings, and so if you try to fault in such a mapping, vmf_insert_pfn_prot() splats when it hits a BUG() check. Fix it by clearing the VM_MAYWRITE flag (userspace writing to the FLUSH_ID doesn't make sense) and requiring VM_SHARED (copy-on-write semantics for the FLUSH_ID don't make sense). Reproducers for both scenarios are in the notes of my patch on the mailing list; I tested that these bugs exist on a Rock 5B machine. Note that I only compile-tested the patch, I haven't tested it; I don't have a working kernel build setup for the test machine yet. Please test it before applying it.

CVE の情報

関連する弱点

CWE-ID 弱点名 出典
CWE Other 情報がありません。

メトリクス

メトリクス スコア 深刻度 CVSS ベクター 出典
V3.1 5.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

nvd@nist.gov

EPSS

EPSSは脆弱性が悪用される可能性を予測するスコアリングモデルです。

EPSSスコア

EPSSモデルは0から1(0〜100%)の確率スコアを算出します。スコアが高いほど、脆弱性が悪用される可能性が高いことを示します。

EPSSパーセンタイル

パーセンタイルはCVEをEPSSスコアで順位付けするために使用されます。例えば、EPSSスコアで95パーセンタイルにあるCVEは、他の95%のCVEよりも悪用される可能性が高いことを意味します。パーセンタイルはCVEのEPSSスコアを他のCVEと比較するために使用されます。

関連製品

構成 0

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version ~から(含む) 6.10 ~まで(含まない) 6.11.8

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.12

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.12

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.12

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.12

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.12

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.12

参考資料