CVE-2026-64599 : 詳細

CVE-2026-64599

7.8
/
高
2026-08-06
08h16 +00:00
Local
2026-10-24
16h10 +00:00
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CVE の説明

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: amlogic - avoid double cleanup in meson_crypto_probe() When meson_allocate_chanlist() fails after a partial allocation, it already unwinds the allocated chanlist state through its local error path. meson_crypto_probe() then jump to error_flow and calls meson_free_chanlist() again, causing the same per-flow resources to be torn down twice. In the reproduced failure path, the second teardown re-entered crypto_engine_exit() on an already destroyed worker and KASAN reported a slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker(). Prevent double-free by handling partial allocation failures locally within meson_allocate_chanlist() and skipping the outer cleanup path. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. The bug was reproduced in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN on v7.1, using the reproducer under tools/testing/meson_crypto_probe. The reproducer forces the second dma_alloc_attrs() call in the gxl-crypto probe path to return NULL, making meson_allocate_chanlist() fail after partial initialization. On the unpatched kernel this reliably triggered a slab-use-after-free. With this fix applied, the same reproducer no longer emits any KASAN report and the probe fails cleanly with -ENOMEM. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 Read of size 8 at addr ff1100010c057a68 by task insmod/265 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 265 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 7.1.0-rc2-00376-g810af9adc907-dirty #10 PREEMPT(lazy) Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0 print_report+0xcb/0x5e0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x21d/0x3f0 ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 kasan_report+0xca/0x100 ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 meson_crypto_probe+0x4d0/0xc10 [amlogic_gxl_crypto] platform_probe+0x99/0x140 really_probe+0x1c6/0x6a0 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 __driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310 ? acpi_driver_match_device+0xb0/0x100 driver_probe_device+0x48/0x210 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 __device_attach_driver+0x160/0x320 bus_for_each_drv+0x104/0x190 ? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50 __device_attach+0x19d/0x3b0 ? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x220 device_initial_probe+0x78/0xa0 bus_probe_device+0x5b/0x130 device_add+0xcfd/0x1430 ? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10 ? insert_resource+0x34/0x50 ? lock_release+0xc9/0x290 platform_device_add+0x24e/0x590 ? __pfx_meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x10/0x10 [meson_crypto_probe_repro] meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x330/0xff0 [meson_crypto_probe_repro] do_one_initcall+0xc0/0x450 ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50 ? __create_object+0x59/0x80 ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 do_init_module+0x27b/0x7d0 ? __pfx_do_init_module+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x84/0x1d0 ? kfree+0x32c/0x510 ? load_module+0x561e/0x5ff0 load_module+0x54fe/0x5ff0 ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10 ? security_file_permission+0x20/0x40 ? kernel_read_file+0x23d/0x6e0 ? mmap_region+0x235/0x4a0 ? __pfx_kernel_read_file+0x10/0x10 ? __file_has_perm+0x2c0/0x3e0 init_module_from_file+0x158/0x180 ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10 ? __lock_acquire+0x45a/0x1ba0 ? idempotent_init_module+0x315/0x610 ? lock_release+0xc9/0x290 ? lock ---truncated---

CVE の情報

関連する弱点

CWE-ID 弱点名 出典
CWE-415 Double Free
The product calls free() twice on the same memory address.

メトリクス

メトリクス スコア 深刻度 CVSS ベクター 出典
V3.1 7.8 HIGH CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

High

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

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参考資料