CWE-1223
Race Condition for Write-Once Attributes
2020-02-24
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特定のCWEの通知
特定のCWEの変更情報をいち早くお届けします。
名前: Race Condition for Write-Once Attributes
A write-once register in hardware design is programmable by an untrusted software component earlier than the trusted software component, resulting in a race condition issue.
一般情報
背景の詳細
導入モード
Architecture and Design : This weakness can appear in designs that use register write-once attributes with two or more software/firmware modules with varying levels of trust executing in parallel.適用可能なプラットフォーム
言語
名前： Verilog (Undetermined)名前： VHDL (Undetermined)
テクノロジー
クラス： System on Chip (Undetermined)一般的な結果
| スコープ | 影響 | 可能性 |
|---|---|---|
| Access Control | Bypass Protection Mechanism 注記：System configuration cannot be programmed in a secure way. |
潜在的な緩和策
Phases : Architecture and DesignDuring hardware design, all register write-once or sticky fields must be evaluated for proper configuration.
検出方法
Automated Analysis
The testing phase should use automated tools to test that values are not reprogrammable and that write-once fields lock on writing zeros.脆弱性マッピングノート
理由 : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.コメント : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
関連する攻撃パターン
| CAPEC ID | 攻撃パターン名 |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-26 | Leveraging Race Conditions
The adversary targets a race condition occurring when multiple processes access and manipulate the same resource concurrently, and the outcome of the execution depends on the particular order in which the access takes place. The adversary can leverage a race condition by "running the race", modifying the resource and modifying the normal execution flow. For instance, a race condition can occur while accessing a file: the adversary can trick the system by replacing the original file with their version and cause the system to read the malicious file. |
登録情報
| 名前 | 組織 | 日付 | リリース日 | Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi | Intel Corporation | 4.0 |
変更履歴
| 名前 | 組織 | 日付 | コメント |
|---|---|---|---|
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, Weakness_Ordinalities | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Background_Details, Description |
