背景の詳細
導入モード
Architecture and Design
Implementation
適用可能なプラットフォーム
言語
クラス: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
オペレーティングシステム
クラス: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)
アーキテクチャ
クラス: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)
テクノロジー
名前: Bus/Interface Hardware (Undetermined)
クラス: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
一般的な結果
| スコープ |
影響 |
可能性 |
Confidentiality Integrity Access Control Authorization | Bypass Protection Mechanism, Read Memory, Modify Memory
注記:When protected and unprotected ranges overlap, an attacker could send a transaction and potentially compromise the protections in place, violating the principle of least privilege. | Medium |
観察された例
| 参考文献 |
説明 |
| Attacker can modify MCHBAR register to overlap with an attacker-controlled region, which modification prevents the SENTER instruction from properly applying VT-d protection while a Measured Launch Environment is being launched. |
潜在的な緩和策
Phases : Architecture and Design
When architecting the address map of the chip, ensure that protected and unprotected ranges are isolated and do not overlap. When designing, ensure that ranges hardcoded in Register-Transfer Level (RTL) do not overlap.
Phases : Implementation
Ranges configured by firmware should not overlap. If overlaps are mandatory because of constraints such as a limited number of registers, then ensure that no assets are present in the overlapped portion.
Phases : Testing
Validate mitigation actions with robust testing.
検出方法
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Review address map in specification to see if there are any overlapping ranges.
有効性 : High
Manual Static Analysis
Negative testing of access control on overlapped ranges.
有効性 : High
脆弱性マッピングノート
理由 : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
コメント : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
関連する攻撃パターン
| CAPEC ID |
攻撃パターン名 |
| CAPEC-456 |
Infected Memory
An adversary inserts malicious logic into memory enabling them to achieve a negative impact. This logic is often hidden from the user of the system and works behind the scenes to achieve negative impacts. This pattern of attack focuses on systems already fielded and used in operation as opposed to systems that are still under development and part of the supply chain. |
| CAPEC-679 |
Exploitation of Improperly Configured or Implemented Memory Protections
|
ノート
As of CWE 4.6, CWE-1260 and CWE-1316 are siblings under view 1000, but CWE-1260 might be a parent of CWE-1316. More analysis is warranted.
参考文献
REF-1137
BARing the System - New vulnerabilities in Coreboot & UEFI-based Systems
Yuriy Bulygin, Oleksandr Bazhaniuk, Andrew Furtak, John Loucaides, Mikhail Gorobets.
https://www.c7zero.info/stuff/REConBrussels2017_BARing_the_system.pdf
登録情報
| 名前 |
組織 |
日付 |
リリース日 |
Version |
| Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna |
Intel Corporation |
2020-06-01 +00:00 |
2020-12-10 +00:00 |
4.3 |
変更履歴
| 名前 |
組織 |
日付 |
コメント |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Maintenance_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-04-28 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-06-28 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-10-13 +00:00 |
updated References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Weakness_Ordinalities |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2026-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Description |