背景の詳細
導入モード
Architecture and Design
Implementation
適用可能なプラットフォーム
言語
クラス: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
オペレーティングシステム
クラス: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)
アーキテクチャ
クラス: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)
テクノロジー
名前: Security Hardware (Undetermined)
クラス: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
一般的な結果
| スコープ |
影響 |
可能性 |
Confidentiality Availability | DoS: Resource Consumption (Other), Varies by Context, Other
注記:Attackers may infer data that belongs to a trusted agent. The methods used to perform this attack may result in noticeably increased resource consumption. | Medium |
観察された例
| 参考文献 |
説明 |
| Improper isolation of shared resource in a network-on-chip leads to denial of service |
潜在的な緩和策
Phases : Architecture and Design // Implementation
Implement priority-based arbitration inside the NoC and have dedicated buffers or virtual channels for routing secret data from trusted agents.
検出方法
Manual Analysis
Providing marker flags to send through the interfaces coupled with examination of which users are able to read or manipulate the flags will help verify that the proper isolation has been achieved and is effective.
有効性 : Moderate
脆弱性マッピングノート
理由 : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
コメント : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
関連する攻撃パターン
| CAPEC ID |
攻撃パターン名 |
| CAPEC-124 |
Shared Resource Manipulation
An adversary exploits a resource shared between multiple applications, an application pool or hardware pin multiplexing to affect behavior. Resources may be shared between multiple applications or between multiple threads of a single application. Resource sharing is usually accomplished through mutual access to a single memory location or multiplexed hardware pins. If an adversary can manipulate this shared resource (usually by co-opting one of the applications or threads) the other applications or threads using the shared resource will often continue to trust the validity of the compromised shared resource and use it in their calculations. This can result in invalid trust assumptions, corruption of additional data through the normal operations of the other users of the shared resource, or even cause a crash or compromise of the sharing applications. |
参考文献
REF-1155
SurfNoC: A Low Latency and Provably Non-Interfering Approach to Secure Networks-On-Chip
Hassan M. G. Wassel, Ying Gao, Jason K. Oberg, Tedd Huffmire, Ryan Kastner, Frederic T. Chong, Timothy Sherwood.
http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~kastner/papers/isca13-surfNOC.pdf REF-1241
Network on a chip
Wikipedia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_on_a_chip REF-1242
A Survey of Network-on-Chip Security Attacks and Countermeasures
Subodha Charles, Prabhat Mishra.
https://dl.acm.org/doi/fullHtml/10.1145/3450964 REF-1245
Design of Secure and Trustworthy Network-on-chip Architectures
Subodha Charles.
https://www.cise.ufl.edu/research/cad/Publications/charlesThesis.pdf
登録情報
| 名前 |
組織 |
日付 |
リリース日 |
Version |
| Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati K. Manna |
Intel Corporation |
2020-05-23 +00:00 |
2020-12-10 +00:00 |
4.3 |
変更履歴
| 名前 |
組織 |
日付 |
コメント |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Background_Details, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, References, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-04-28 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-06-28 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples |