名前: Missing Check for Certificate Revocation after Initial Check

The product does not check the revocation status of a certificate after its initial revocation check, which can cause the product to perform privileged actions even after the certificate is revoked at a later time.

一般情報

導入モード

Implementation

適用可能なプラットフォーム

言語

クラス： Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

一般的な結果

スコープ	影響	可能性
Access Control	Gain Privileges or Assume Identity 注記：If the revocation status of a certificate is not checked before each action that requires privileges, the system may be subject to a race condition. Trust may be assigned to an entity who is not who it claims to be. If a certificate is revoked after the initial check, all subsequent actions taken with the owner of the revoked certificate will lose all benefits guaranteed by the certificate. In fact, it is almost certain that the use of a revoked certificate indicates malicious activity.
Integrity	Modify Application Data 注記：Data from an untrusted (and possibly malicious) source may be integrated.
Confidentiality	Read Application Data 注記：Data may be disclosed to an entity impersonating a trusted entity, resulting in information disclosure.

潜在的な緩和策

Phases : Architecture and Design
Ensure that certificates are checked for revoked status before each use of a protected resource. If the certificate is checked before each access of a protected resource, the delay subject to a possible race condition becomes almost negligible and significantly reduces the risk associated with this issue.

脆弱性マッピングノート

理由 : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
コメント : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

関連する攻撃パターン

CAPEC ID	攻撃パターン名
CAPEC-26	Leveraging Race Conditions The adversary targets a race condition occurring when multiple processes access and manipulate the same resource concurrently, and the outcome of the execution depends on the particular order in which the access takes place. The adversary can leverage a race condition by "running the race", modifying the resource and modifying the normal execution flow. For instance, a race condition can occur while accessing a file: the adversary can trick the system by replacing the original file with their version and cause the system to read the malicious file.
CAPEC-29	Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Conditions This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time of check (state) for a resource and the time of use of a resource. A typical example is file access. The adversary can leverage a file access race condition by "running the race", meaning that they would modify the resource between the first time the target program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. During that period of time, the adversary could replace or modify the file, causing the application to behave unexpectedly.

参考文献

REF-18

The CLASP Application Security Process
Secure Software, Inc..
https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf

REF-44

24 Deadly Sins of Software Security
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega.

登録情報

名前	組織	日付	リリース日	Version
CLASP		2006-07-19 +00:00	2006-07-19 +00:00	Draft 3

変更履歴

名前	組織	日付	コメント
Eric Dalci	Cigital	2008-07-01 +00:00	updated Time_of_Introduction
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2008-09-08 +00:00	updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2008-10-14 +00:00	updated Description, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2009-05-27 +00:00	updated Name, Relationships
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2011-06-01 +00:00	updated Common_Consequences
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2012-05-11 +00:00	updated References, Relationships
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2013-02-21 +00:00	updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2014-07-30 +00:00	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2017-11-08 +00:00	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Type
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2020-02-24 +00:00	updated References, Relationships
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2023-01-31 +00:00	updated Description
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2023-04-27 +00:00	updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2023-06-29 +00:00	updated Mapping_Notes
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2025-12-11 +00:00	updated Weakness_Ordinalities
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2026-10-28 +00:00	updated Common_Consequences, Description

CWE-370 詳細

CWE-370