CVE-2025-6785
14h13 +00:00
CVE 설명
Tesla Model 3 Physical CAN Bus Injection
Securing externally available CAN wires can easily allow physical access to the CAN bus, allowing possible injection of specially formed CAN messages to control remote start functions of the vehicle. Testing completed on Tesla Model 3 vehicles with software version v11.1 (2023.20.9 ee6de92ddac5). This issue affects Model 3: With software versions from 2023.Xx before 2023.44.CVE 정보
관련 약점
| 약점 이름 | 출처 | |
|---|---|---|
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component The product constructs all or part of a command, data structure, or record using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify how it is parsed or interpreted when it is sent to a downstream component. |
||
| Improper Physical Access Control The product is designed with access restricted to certain information, but it does not sufficiently protect against an unauthorized actor with physical access to these areas. |
메트릭
| 메트릭 | 점수 | 심각도 | CVSS 벡터 | 출처 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V4.0 | 4.7 | MEDIUM |
CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/S:N/AU:Y/R:A/V:D/RE:L/U:Amber
추가 정보
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the “thing that is vulnerable”, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable system. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Physical The attack requires the attacker to physically touch or manipulate the vulnerable system. Physical interaction may be brief (e.g., evil maid attack1) or persistent. An example of such an attack is a cold boot attack in which an attacker gains access to disk encryption keys after physically accessing the target system. Other examples include peripheral attacks via FireWire/USB Direct Memory Access (DMA). Attack Complexity This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. Low The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system. Attack Requirements This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. None The successful attack does not depend on the deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system. The attacker can expect to be able to reach the vulnerability and execute the exploit under all or most instances of the vulnerability. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. None The attacker is unauthenticated prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the system due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. None There is no loss of confidentiality within the Vulnerable System. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. None There is no loss of integrity within the Vulnerable System. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted system resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. None There is no impact to availability within the Vulnerable System. Sub Confidentiality Impact High There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the Subsequent System being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Sub Integrity Impact High There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the Subsequent System. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the Subsequent System. Sub Availability Impact High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the Subsequent System; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the Subsequent System (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Threat MetricsThe Threat metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability for a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the consumer analyst to customize the resulting score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of complementary/alternative security controls in place, Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. The metrics are the modified equivalent of Base metrics and are assigned values based on the system placement within organizational infrastructure. Supplemental MetricsSupplemental metric group provides new metrics that describe and measure additional extrinsic attributes of a vulnerability. While the assessment of Supplemental metrics is provisioned by the provider, the usage and response plan of each metric within the Supplemental metric group is determined by the consumer. Automatable The “Automatable” metric captures the answer to the question ”Can an attacker automate exploitation events for this vulnerability across multiple targets?” based on steps 1-4 of the kill chain2 [Hutchins et al., 2011]. These steps are reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, and exploitation. If evaluated, the metric can take the values no or yes. Yes Attackers can reliably automate all 4 steps of the kill chain. These steps are reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, and exploitation (e.g., the vulnerability is “wormable”). Recovery Recovery describes the resilience of a system to recover services, in terms of performance and availability, after an attack has been performed. Automatic The system recovers services automatically after an attack has been performed. Safety Like all Supplemental Metrics, providing a value for Safety is completely optional. Suppliers and vendors (AKA: scoring providers) may or may not provide Safety as a Supplemental Metric as they see fit. Negligible Consequences of the vulnerability meet definition of IEC 61508 consequence category 'negligible'. Value Density Value Density describes the resources that the attacker will gain control over with a single exploitation event. It has two possible values, diffuse and concentrated: Diffuse The vulnerable system has limited resources. That is, the resources that the attacker will gain control over with a single exploitation event are relatively small. An example of Diffuse (think: limited) Value Density would be an attack on a single email client vulnerability. Vulnerability Response Effort The intention of the Vulnerability Response Effort metric is to provide supplemental information on how difficult it is for consumers to provide an initial response to the impact of vulnerabilities for deployed products and services in their infrastructure. Low The effort required to respond to a vulnerability is low/trivial. Examples include: communication on better documentation, configuration workarounds, or guidance from the vendor that does not require an immediate update, upgrade, or replacement by the consuming entity, such as firewall filter configuration. Provider Urgency Many vendors currently provide supplemental severity ratings to consumers via product security advisories. Amber Provider has assessed the impact of this vulnerability as having a moderate urgency. |
