CVE-2025-68175
13h42 +00:00
CVE 설명
media: nxp: imx8-isi: Fix streaming cleanup on release
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: nxp: imx8-isi: Fix streaming cleanup on release The current implementation unconditionally calls mxc_isi_video_cleanup_streaming() in mxc_isi_video_release(). This can lead to situations where any release call (like from a simple "v4l2-ctl -l") may release a currently streaming queue when called on such a device. This is reproducible on an i.MX8MP board by streaming from an ISI capture device using gstreamer: gst-launch-1.0 -v v4l2src device=/dev/videoX ! \ video/x-raw,format=GRAY8,width=1280,height=800,framerate=1/120 ! \ fakesink While this stream is running, querying the caps of the same device provokes the error state: v4l2-ctl -l -d /dev/videoX This results in the following trace: [ 155.452152] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 155.452163] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1708 at drivers/media/platform/nxp/imx8-isi/imx8-isi-pipe.c:713 mxc_isi_pipe_irq_handler+0x19c/0x1b0 [imx8_isi] [ 157.004248] Modules linked in: cfg80211 rpmsg_ctrl rpmsg_char rpmsg_tty virtio_rpmsg_bus rpmsg_ns rpmsg_core rfkill nft_ct nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables mcp251x6 [ 157.053499] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1708 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.15.4-00114-g1f61ca5cad76 #1 PREEMPT [ 157.064369] Hardware name: imx8mp_board_01 (DT) [ 157.068205] pstate: 400000c5 (nZcv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 157.075169] pc : mxc_isi_pipe_irq_handler+0x19c/0x1b0 [imx8_isi] [ 157.081195] lr : mxc_isi_pipe_irq_handler+0x38/0x1b0 [imx8_isi] [ 157.087126] sp : ffff800080003ee0 [ 157.090438] x29: ffff800080003ee0 x28: ffff0000c3688000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 157.097580] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0000c1e7ac00 x24: ffff800081b5ad50 [ 157.104723] x23: 00000000000000d1 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff0000c25e4000 [ 157.111866] x20: 0000000060000200 x19: ffff80007a0608d0 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 157.119008] x17: ffff80006a4e3000 x16: ffff800080000000 x15: 0000000000000000 [ 157.126146] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 157.133287] x11: 0000000000000040 x10: ffff0000c01445f0 x9 : ffff80007a053a38 [ 157.140425] x8 : ffff0000c04004b8 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 157.147567] x5 : ffff0000c0400490 x4 : ffff80006a4e3000 x3 : ffff0000c25e4000 [ 157.154706] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff8000825c0014 x0 : 0000000060000200 [ 157.161850] Call trace: [ 157.164296] mxc_isi_pipe_irq_handler+0x19c/0x1b0 [imx8_isi] (P) [ 157.170319] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x58/0x218 [ 157.175029] handle_irq_event+0x54/0xb8 [ 157.178867] handle_fasteoi_irq+0xac/0x248 [ 157.182968] handle_irq_desc+0x48/0x68 [ 157.186723] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x24/0x38 [ 157.191346] gic_handle_irq+0x54/0x120 [ 157.195098] call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x30 [ 157.199027] do_interrupt_handler+0x88/0x98 [ 157.203212] el0_interrupt+0x44/0xc0 [ 157.206792] __el0_irq_handler_common+0x18/0x28 [ 157.211328] el0t_64_irq_handler+0x10/0x20 [ 157.215429] el0t_64_irq+0x198/0x1a0 [ 157.219009] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Address this issue by moving the streaming preparation and cleanup to the vb2 .prepare_streaming() and .unprepare_streaming() operations. This also simplifies the driver by allowing direct usage of the vb2_ioctl_streamon() and vb2_ioctl_streamoff() helpers, and removal of the manual cleanup from mxc_isi_video_release().CVE 정보
메트릭
| 메트릭 | 점수 | 심각도 | CVSS 벡터 | 출처 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V3.1 | 7.8 | HIGH |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
추가 정보
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Local The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities. Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Low Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. Low The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsThe Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. Unchanged An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. High There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. |
