CVE-2026-43323 : 상세 정보

CVE-2026-43323

5.5
/
보통
0.02%V4
2026-05-08
14h16 +00:00
Local
2026-11-06
16h18 +00:00
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CVE 설명

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/fair: Fix zero_vruntime tracking fix John reported that stress-ng-yield could make his machine unhappy and managed to bisect it to commit b3d99f43c72b ("sched/fair: Fix zero_vruntime tracking"). The combination of yield and that commit was specific enough to hypothesize the following scenario: Suppose we have 2 runnable tasks, both doing yield. Then one will be eligible and one will not be, because the average position must be in between these two entities. Therefore, the runnable task will be eligible, and be promoted a full slice (all the tasks do is yield after all). This causes it to jump over the other task and now the other task is eligible and current is no longer. So we schedule. Since we are runnable, there is no {de,en}queue. All we have is the __{en,de}queue_entity() from {put_prev,set_next}_task(). But per the fingered commit, those two no longer move zero_vruntime. All that moves zero_vruntime are tick and full {de,en}queue. This means, that if the two tasks playing leapfrog can reach the critical speed to reach the overflow point inside one tick's worth of time, we're up a creek. Additionally, when multiple cgroups are involved, there is no guarantee the tick will in fact hit every cgroup in a timely manner. Statistically speaking it will, but that same statistics does not rule out the possibility of one cgroup not getting a tick for a significant amount of time -- however unlikely. Therefore, just like with the yield() case, force an update at the end of every slice. This ensures the update is never more than a single slice behind and the whole thing is within 2 lag bounds as per the comment on entity_key().

CVE 정보

관련 약점

CWE-ID 약점 이름 출처
CWE Other 정보 없음.

메트릭

메트릭 점수 심각도 CVSS 벡터 출처
V3.1 5.5 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Local

The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities.

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

Low

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

High

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

nvd@nist.gov

EPSS

EPSS는 취약점이 악용될 가능성을 예측하는 점수 모델입니다.

EPSS 점수

EPSS 모델은 0과 1(0~100%) 사이의 확률 점수를 생성합니다. 점수가 높을수록 취약점이 악용될 가능성이 높습니다.

EPSS 백분위수

백분위수는 EPSS 점수에 따라 CVE의 순위를 매기는 데 사용됩니다. 예를 들어 EPSS 점수 기준 95번째 백분위수의 CVE는 다른 CVE의 95%보다 악용될 가능성이 높습니다.

언급된 제품

구성 0

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 부터 (포함) 6.12.78 까지 (미포함) 6.12.81

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 부터 (포함) 6.18.17 까지 (미포함) 6.18.22

Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 부터 (포함) 6.19.7 까지 (미포함) 6.19.12

참고 자료