CVE 설명

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mvneta: re-enable percpu interrupt on resume On Marvell MPIC platforms (Armada 370/XP/38x), mvneta uses a percpu IRQ disable/enable scheme for NAPI: the ISR (mvneta_percpu_isr) calls disable_percpu_irq() to mask the MPIC per-CPU interrupt and schedules NAPI poll, which calls enable_percpu_irq() on completion to unmask. If suspend occurs while NAPI poll is pending (between disable_percpu_irq in the ISR and enable_percpu_irq in poll completion), the interrupt is never re-enabled: 1. mvneta_percpu_isr: disable_percpu_irq() + napi_schedule() => MPIC masked, percpu_enabled cpumask bit cleared 2. NAPI poll does not complete before suspend proceeds (on PREEMPT_RT this is highly likely since softirqs run in ksoftirqd which gets frozen; on non-RT it can happen when softirq processing is deferred to ksoftirqd) 3. mvneta_stop_dev => napi_disable(): cancels the pending poll without executing the completion path 4. suspend_device_irqs => IRQCHIP_MASK_ON_SUSPEND: masks MPIC (already masked, but records IRQS_SUSPENDED) 5. Resume: mpic_resume checks irq_percpu_is_enabled() => false (bit was cleared in step 1) => skips unmask 6. mvneta_start_dev only restores device-level INTR_NEW_MASK, does not touch the MPIC per-CPU mask Result: MPIC per-CPU interrupt stays masked permanently. The NIC generates interrupts (INTR_NEW_CAUSE != 0) but the CPU never receives them, causing complete loss of network connectivity. Fix by calling on_each_cpu(mvneta_percpu_enable) in the resume path to unconditionally unmask the MPIC per-CPU interrupt regardless of pre-suspend state.

CVE 정보

메트릭

메트릭	점수	심각도	CVSS 벡터	출처
V3.1	7.5	HIGH	CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H 추가 정보 Base: Exploitabilty Metrics The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Network The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Low Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. None The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope Metrics The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. Unchanged An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact Metrics The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. None There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. None There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal Metrics The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental Metrics These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.	416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67