CVE-2026-82840
22h05 +00:00
CVE 설명
Apache Wicket: The session id is renewed only on the first sign in, not on re-authentication
Session fixation in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.authroles.authentication.AuthenticatedWebSession is the authentication base class of Wicket's role-based security module, and its signIn(String, String) method is the entry point through which an application authenticates a session. Renewing the container session id at that point is the standard defence against an attacker who has fixed a session id in a victim's browser, and Wicket provides that renewal as org.apache.wicket.Session#changeSessionId(), whose documentation directs callers to invoke it on login for exactly that reason. AuthenticatedWebSession#signIn(String, String) calls it inside a guard that succeeds only on the first transition of the session's signed-in flag. The session id is therefore renewed when a session first signs in, and is not renewed when a session that is already signed in authenticates again. signIn(String, String) returns true either way, so neither the caller nor the application can tell that the renewal did not happen. An application is affected where it authenticates through AuthenticatedWebSession, which AuthenticatedWebApplication requires and which the shipped UsernamePasswordPanel uses, and where a session that is already signed in can authenticate again: a step-up prompt before a sensitive action, an account switch, or simply a sign-in form that stays reachable once the user is signed in. Nothing in the module hides that form from a signed-in session. Reaching the defect also requires an attacker to place a session id of their choosing in the victim's browser. JSESSIONID is set by the servlet container rather than by Wicket, so that needs a position Wicket does not grant, such as control of a host under the same registrable domain or a container configured to carry the session id in the URL, and the planted session has to be one the attacker has already signed in on, because a session that is not yet signed in does have its id renewed by the victim's authentication. An authentication attempt that fails signs the session out and closes the window. Applications that renew the session id in their own code after a successful authentication are not affected. As a workaround, renew the session id from the application's own code on every successful authentication, by calling Session#changeSessionId() at the end of the authenticate(String, String) implementation. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.18.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.23.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.9.0 through 10.11.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.CVE 정보
관련 약점
| 약점 이름 | 출처 | |
|---|---|---|
| Session Fixation Authenticating a user, or otherwise establishing a new user session, without invalidating any existing session identifier gives an attacker the opportunity to steal authenticated sessions. |
메트릭
| 메트릭 | 점수 | 심각도 | CVSS 벡터 | 출처 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V4.0 | 7.2 | HIGH |
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
추가 정보
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the “thing that is vulnerable”, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable system. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Network The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers). Attack Complexity This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. Low The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system. Attack Requirements This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. Present The successful attack depends on the presence of specific deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These include: A race condition must be won to successfully exploit the vulnerability. The successfulness of the attack is conditioned on execution conditions that are not under full control of the attacker. The attack may need to be launched multiple times against a single target before being successful. Network injection. The attacker must inject themselves into the logical network path between the target and the resource requested by the victim (e.g. vulnerabilities requiring an on-path attacker). Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. Low The attacker requires privileges that provide basic capabilities that are typically limited to settings and resources owned by a single low-privileged user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. Active Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a targeted user to perform specific, conscious interactions with the vulnerable system and the attacker’s payload, or the user’s interactions would actively subvert protection mechanisms which would lead to exploitation of the vulnerability. Examples include: importing a file into a vulnerable system in a specific manner placing files into a specific directory prior to executing code submitting a specific string into a web application (e.g. reflected or self XSS) dismiss or accept prompts or security warnings prior to taking an action (e.g. opening/editing a file, connecting a device). Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the system due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all information within the Vulnerable System being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the Vulnerable System. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the Vulnerable System. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted system resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. None There is no impact to availability within the Vulnerable System. Sub Confidentiality Impact Negligible There is no loss of confidentiality within the Subsequent System or all confidentiality impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System. Sub Integrity Impact None There is no loss of integrity within the Subsequent System or all integrity impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System. Sub Availability Impact None There is no impact to availability within the Subsequent System or all availability impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System. Threat MetricsThe Threat metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability for a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the consumer analyst to customize the resulting score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of complementary/alternative security controls in place, Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. The metrics are the modified equivalent of Base metrics and are assigned values based on the system placement within organizational infrastructure. Supplemental MetricsSupplemental metric group provides new metrics that describe and measure additional extrinsic attributes of a vulnerability. While the assessment of Supplemental metrics is provisioned by the provider, the usage and response plan of each metric within the Supplemental metric group is determined by the consumer. |
