취약점 도입 방식
Architecture and Design : DMA is included in a number of devices because it allows
data transfer between the computer and the connected device, using
direct hardware access to read or write directly to main memory
without any OS interaction.
적용 가능한 플랫폼
언어
클래스: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
기술
클래스: System on Chip (Undetermined)
일반적인 결과
| 범위 |
영향 |
가능성 |
| Access Control | Bypass Protection Mechanism, Modify Memory
참고: An attacker could exploit this to
access secrets. DMA devices have direct write access to main memory and
due to time of attack will be able to bypass OS or Bootloader
access control. | High |
잠재적 완화 방법
Phases : Architecture and Design
Utilize an IOMMU to orchestrate IO access from
the start of the boot process.
취약점 매핑 메모
근거 : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
댓글 : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
관련 공격 패턴
| CAPEC ID |
공격 패턴 이름 |
| CAPEC-180 |
Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels
An attacker exploits a weakness in the configuration of access controls and is able to bypass the intended protection that these measures guard against and thereby obtain unauthorized access to the system or network. Sensitive functionality should always be protected with access controls. However configuring all but the most trivial access control systems can be very complicated and there are many opportunities for mistakes. If an attacker can learn of incorrectly configured access security settings, they may be able to exploit this in an attack. |
참고 자료
REF-1038
DMA attack
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMA_attack REF-1039
Thunderclap: Exploring Vulnerabilities in Operating System IOMMU Protection via DMA from Untrustworthy Peripherals
A. Theodore Markettos, Colin Rothwell, Brett F. Gutstein, Allison Pearce, Peter G. Neumann, Simon W. Moore, Robert N. M. Watson.
https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ndss2019_05A-1_Markettos_paper.pdf REF-1040
FireWire all your memory are belong to us
Maximillian Dornseif, Michael Becher, Christian N. Klein.
http://www.orkspace.net/secdocs/Conferences/CanSecWest/2005/0wn3d%20by%20an%20iPod%20-%20Firewire1394%20Issues.pdf REF-1041
Integrating DMA attacks in exploitation frameworks
Rory Breuk, Albert Spruyt, Adam Boileau.
https://www.os3.nl/_media/2011-2012/courses/rp1/p14_report.pdf REF-1042
Owned by an iPod
Maximillian Dornseif.
https://web.archive.org/web/20060505224959/https://pacsec.jp/psj04/psj04-dornseif-e.ppt REF-1044
My aimful life
Dmytro Oleksiuk.
http://blog.cr4.sh/2015/09/breaking-uefi-security-with-software.html REF-1046
Hit by a Bus:Physical Access Attacks with Firewire
A. Theodore Markettos, Adam Boileau.
https://security-assessment.com/files/presentations/ab_firewire_rux2k6-final.pdf
제출
| 이름 |
조직 |
날짜 |
출시일 |
Version |
| Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi |
Intel Corporation |
2019-10-15 +00:00 |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
4.0 |
수정 사항
| 이름 |
조직 |
날짜 |
댓글 |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-08-20 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Weakness_Ordinalities |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2026-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Modes_of_Introduction |