CWE-1223
Race Condition for Write-Once Attributes
Incomplete
2020-02-24
00h00 +00:00
00h00 +00:00
2025-12-11
00h00 +00:00
00h00 +00:00
Powiadomienia dla konkretnego CWE
Bądź na bieżąco z wszelkimi zmianami dotyczącymi konkretnego CWE.
Nazwa: Race Condition for Write-Once Attributes
A write-once register in hardware design is programmable by an untrusted software component earlier than the trusted software component, resulting in a race condition issue.
Informacje ogólne
Sposoby wprowadzenia
Architecture and Design : This weakness can appear in designs that use register write-once attributes with two or more software/firmware modules with varying levels of trust executing in parallel.Odpowiednie platformy
Język
Name: Verilog (Undetermined)Name: VHDL (Undetermined)
Technologie
Class: System on Chip (Undetermined)Typowe konsekwencje
| Zakres | Wpływ | Prawdopodobieństwo |
|---|---|---|
| Access Control | Bypass Protection Mechanism Note: System configuration cannot be programmed in a secure way. |
Potencjalne środki zaradcze
Phases : Architecture and DesignDuring hardware design, all register write-once or sticky fields must be evaluated for proper configuration.
Metody wykrywania
Automated Analysis
The testing phase should use automated tools to test that values are not reprogrammable and that write-once fields lock on writing zeros.Uwagi dotyczące mapowania podatności
Uzasadnienie : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Komentarz : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Powiązane wzorce ataków
| CAPEC-ID | Nazwa wzorca ataku |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-26 | Leveraging Race Conditions
The adversary targets a race condition occurring when multiple processes access and manipulate the same resource concurrently, and the outcome of the execution depends on the particular order in which the access takes place. The adversary can leverage a race condition by "running the race", modifying the resource and modifying the normal execution flow. For instance, a race condition can occur while accessing a file: the adversary can trick the system by replacing the original file with their version and cause the system to read the malicious file. |
Zgłoszenie
| Nazwa | Organizacja | Data | Data wydania | Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi | Intel Corporation | 4.0 |
Modyfikacje
| Nazwa | Organizacja | Data | Komentarz |
|---|---|---|---|
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, Weakness_Ordinalities |
