Sposoby wprowadzenia
Architecture and Design : This weakness can be introduced during hardware architecture or design but can be identified later during testing.
Odpowiednie platformy
Język
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Systemy operacyjne
Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)
Architektury
Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)
Technologie
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
Typowe konsekwencje
| Zakres |
Wpływ |
Prawdopodobieństwo |
Access Control Integrity | Modify Memory, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
Note: If the volatile-memory-region protections or access controls are insufficient to prevent modifications from an adversary or untrusted agent, the secure boot may be bypassed or replaced with the execution of an adversary's code. | High |
Zaobserwowane przykłady
| Odniesienia |
Opis |
| Locked memory regions may be modified through other interfaces in a secure-boot-loader image due to improper access control. |
Potencjalne środki zaradcze
Phases : Architecture and Design
Ensure that the design of volatile-memory protections is enough to prevent modification from an adversary or untrusted code.
Phases : Testing
Test the volatile-memory protections to ensure they are safe from modification or untrusted code.
Metody wykrywania
Manual Analysis
Ensure the volatile memory is lockable or has locks. Ensure the volatile memory is locked for writes from untrusted agents or adversaries. Try modifying the volatile memory from an untrusted agent, and ensure these writes are dropped.
Skuteczność : High
Manual Analysis
Skuteczność : Moderate
Uwagi dotyczące mapowania podatności
Uzasadnienie : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Komentarz : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Powiązane wzorce ataków
| CAPEC-ID |
Nazwa wzorca ataku |
| CAPEC-456 |
Infected Memory
An adversary inserts malicious logic into memory enabling them to achieve a negative impact. This logic is often hidden from the user of the system and works behind the scenes to achieve negative impacts. This pattern of attack focuses on systems already fielded and used in operation as opposed to systems that are still under development and part of the supply chain. |
| CAPEC-679 |
Exploitation of Improperly Configured or Implemented Memory Protections
|
Zgłoszenie
| Nazwa |
Organizacja |
Data |
Data wydania |
Version |
| Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi |
Intel Corporation |
2020-04-25 +00:00 |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
4.1 |
Modyfikacje
| Nazwa |
Organizacja |
Data |
Komentarz |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-08-20 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-04-28 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2024-02-29 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-04-03 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Description |