Sposoby wprowadzenia
Implementation
Installation
Architecture and Design
Operation
Odpowiednie platformy
Język
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Technologie
Class: Mobile (Undetermined)
Typowe konsekwencje
| Zakres |
Wpływ |
Prawdopodobieństwo |
Confidentiality Integrity Availability Access Control | Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Read Application Data, DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart
Note: An attacker will be able to gain access to any resources that are allowed by the extra privileges. Common results include executing code, disabling services, and reading restricted data. New weaknesses can be exposed because running with extra privileges, such as root or Administrator, can disable the normal security checks being performed by the operating system or surrounding environment. Other pre-existing weaknesses can turn into security vulnerabilities if they occur while operating at raised privileges. | |
Zaobserwowane przykłady
| Odniesienia |
Opis |
| FTP client program on a certain OS runs with setuid privileges and has a buffer overflow. Most clients do not need extra privileges, so an overflow is not a vulnerability for those clients. |
| Program runs with privileges and calls another program with the same privileges, which allows read of arbitrary files. |
| OS incorrectly installs a program with setuid privileges, allowing users to gain privileges. |
| Composite: application running with high privileges (CWE-250) allows user to specify a restricted file to process, which generates a parsing error that leaks the contents of the file (CWE-209). |
| Program does not drop privileges before calling another program, allowing code execution. |
| setuid root program allows creation of arbitrary files through command line argument. |
| Installation script installs some programs as setuid when they shouldn't be. |
| mail program runs as root but does not drop its privileges before attempting to access a file. Attacker can use a symlink from their home directory to a directory only readable by root, then determine whether the file exists based on the response. |
| Product launches Help functionality while running with raised privileges, allowing command execution using Windows message to access "open file" dialog. |
Potencjalne środki zaradcze
Phases : Architecture and Design // Operation
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Identify the functionality that requires additional privileges, such as access to privileged operating system resources. Wrap and centralize this functionality if possible, and isolate the privileged code as much as possible from other code [REF-76]. Raise privileges as late as possible, and drop them as soon as possible to avoid CWE-271. Avoid weaknesses such as CWE-288 and CWE-420 by protecting all possible communication channels that could interact with the privileged code, such as a secondary socket that is only intended to be accessed by administrators.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Identify the functionality that requires additional privileges, such as access to privileged operating system resources. Wrap and centralize this functionality if possible, and isolate the privileged code as much as possible from other code [REF-76]. Raise privileges as late as possible, and drop them as soon as possible to avoid CWE-271. Avoid weaknesses such as CWE-288 and CWE-420 by protecting all possible communication channels that could interact with the privileged code, such as a secondary socket that is only intended to be accessed by administrators.
Phases : Implementation
Perform extensive input validation for any privileged code that must be exposed to the user and reject anything that does not fit your strict requirements.
Phases : Implementation
When dropping privileges, ensure that they have been dropped successfully to avoid CWE-273. As protection mechanisms in the environment get stronger, privilege-dropping calls may fail even if it seems like they would always succeed.
Phases : Implementation
If circumstances force you to run with extra privileges, then determine the minimum access level necessary. First identify the different permissions that the software and its users will need to perform their actions, such as file read and write permissions, network socket permissions, and so forth. Then explicitly allow those actions while denying all else [REF-76]. Perform extensive input validation and canonicalization to minimize the chances of introducing a separate vulnerability. This mitigation is much more prone to error than dropping the privileges in the first place.
Phases : Operation // System Configuration
Ensure that the software runs properly under the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) [REF-199] or an equivalent hardening configuration guide, which many organizations use to limit the attack surface and potential risk of deployed software.
Metody wykrywania
Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Black Box
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
Skuteczność : High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
Skuteczność : SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
Skuteczność : SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
Skuteczność : SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
Skuteczność : High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
Skuteczność : SOAR Partial
Automated Static Analysis
Skuteczność : SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
Skuteczność : High
Uwagi dotyczące mapowania podatności
Uzasadnienie : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Komentarz : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Powiązane wzorce ataków
| CAPEC-ID |
Nazwa wzorca ataku |
| CAPEC-104 |
Cross Zone Scripting
An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security. |
| CAPEC-470 |
Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database
An attacker is able to leverage access gained to the database to read / write data to the file system, compromise the operating system, create a tunnel for accessing the host machine, and use this access to potentially attack other machines on the same network as the database machine. Traditionally SQL injections attacks are viewed as a way to gain unauthorized read access to the data stored in the database, modify the data in the database, delete the data, etc. However, almost every data base management system (DBMS) system includes facilities that if compromised allow an attacker complete access to the file system, operating system, and full access to the host running the database. The attacker can then use this privileged access to launch subsequent attacks. These facilities include dropping into a command shell, creating user defined functions that can call system level libraries present on the host machine, stored procedures, etc. |
| CAPEC-69 |
Target Programs with Elevated Privileges
This attack targets programs running with elevated privileges. The adversary tries to leverage a vulnerability in the running program and get arbitrary code to execute with elevated privileges. |
Notatki
There is a close association with CWE-653 (Insufficient Separation of Privileges). CWE-653 is about providing separate components for each privilege; CWE-250 is about ensuring that each component has the least amount of privileges possible.
CWE-271, CWE-272, and CWE-250 are all closely related and possibly overlapping. CWE-271 is probably better suited as a category. Both CWE-272 and CWE-250 are in active use by the community. The "least privilege" phrase has multiple interpretations.
Privilege management functions can behave in some less-than-obvious ways, and they have different quirks on different platforms. These inconsistencies are particularly pronounced if you are transitioning from one non-root user to another.
Signal handlers and spawned processes run at the privilege of the owning process, so if a process is running as root when a signal fires or a sub-process is executed, the signal handler or sub-process will operate with root privileges.
Odniesienia
REF-6
Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors
Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess, Gary McGraw.
https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf REF-196
The Protection of Information in Computer Systems
Jerome H. Saltzer, Michael D. Schroeder.
http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/protection/ REF-76
Least Privilege
Sean Barnum, Michael Gegick.
https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege REF-7
Writing Secure Code
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc.
https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/writing-secure-code-9780735617223 REF-199
United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB)
NIST.
https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/United-States-Government-Configuration-Baseline REF-44
24 Deadly Sins of Software Security
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega.
REF-62
The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh.
REF-1479
State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation
Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler, Rama S. Moorthy.
https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx
Zgłoszenie
| Nazwa |
Organizacja |
Data |
Data wydania |
Version |
| 7 Pernicious Kingdoms |
|
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
Draft 3 |
Modyfikacje
| Nazwa |
Organizacja |
Data |
Komentarz |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-09-08 +00:00 |
updated Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-10-14 +00:00 |
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-01-12 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Maintenance_Notes, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-03-10 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-05-27 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2010-02-16 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2010-06-21 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-03-29 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-01 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-27 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-09-13 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-05-11 +00:00 |
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-10-30 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2013-07-17 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-02-18 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-07-30 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-11-08 +00:00 |
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2018-03-27 +00:00 |
updated References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2019-01-03 +00:00 |
updated Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2019-09-19 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships, Type |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-04-28 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-10-13 +00:00 |
updated References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-09-09 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors, Diagram, Other_Notes, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Maintenance_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities |