Szczegóły CWE-434

The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment.

Sposoby wprowadzenia

Implementation
Architecture and Design : OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.

Odpowiednie platformy

Język

Name: ASP.NET (Sometimes)
Name: PHP (Often)
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Technologie

Name: Web Server (Sometimes)

Typowe konsekwencje

Zaobserwowane przykłady

Potencjalne środki zaradcze

Phases : Architecture and Design
Generate a new, unique filename for an uploaded file instead of using the user-supplied filename, so that no external input is used at all.[REF-422] [REF-423]
Phases : Architecture and Design
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Consider storing the uploaded files outside of the web document root entirely. Then, use other mechanisms to deliver the files dynamically. [REF-423]
Phases : Implementation
Phases : Architecture and Design
Define a very limited set of allowable extensions and only generate filenames that end in these extensions. Consider the possibility of XSS (CWE-79) before allowing .html or .htm file types.
Phases : Implementation
Ensure that only one extension is used in the filename. Some web servers, including some versions of Apache, may process files based on inner extensions so that "filename.php.gif" is fed to the PHP interpreter.[REF-422] [REF-423]
Phases : Implementation
When running on a web server that supports case-insensitive filenames, perform case-insensitive evaluations of the extensions that are provided.
Phases : Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Phases : Implementation
Do not rely exclusively on sanity checks of file contents to ensure that the file is of the expected type and size. It may be possible for an attacker to hide code in some file segments that will still be executed by the server. For example, GIF images may contain a free-form comments field.
Phases : Implementation
Do not rely exclusively on the MIME content type or filename attribute when determining how to render a file. Validating the MIME content type and ensuring that it matches the extension is only a partial solution.
Phases : Architecture and Design // Operation
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Phases : Architecture and Design // Operation

Metody wykrywania

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

Skuteczność : SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

Skuteczność : SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

Skuteczność : High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

Skuteczność : High

Architecture or Design Review

Skuteczność : High

Uwagi dotyczące mapowania podatności

Uzasadnienie : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Komentarz : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Powiązane wzorce ataków

Notatki

Odniesienia

REF-422

Dynamic File Uploads, Security and You
Richard Stanway (r1CH).
https://web.archive.org/web/20090208005456/http://shsc.info/FileUploadSecurity

REF-423

8 Basic Rules to Implement Secure File Uploads
Johannes Ullrich.
https://www.sans.org/blog/8-basic-rules-to-implement-secure-file-uploads/

REF-424

Top 25 Series - Rank 8 - Unrestricted Upload of Dangerous File Type
Johannes Ullrich.
https://www.sans.org/blog/top-25-series-rank-8-unrestricted-upload-of-dangerous-file-type/

REF-76

Least Privilege
Sean Barnum, Michael Gegick.
https://web.archive.org/web/20211209014121/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/least-privilege

REF-62

The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh.

REF-962

Automated Source Code Security Measure (ASCSM)
Object Management Group (OMG).
http://www.omg.org/spec/ASCSM/1.0/

REF-1479

State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation
Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler, Rama S. Moorthy.
https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx

Zgłoszenie

Modyfikacje