CVE-2024-27004
05h28 +00:00
Mô tả CVE
clk: Get runtime PM before walking tree during disable_unused
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: Get runtime PM before walking tree during disable_unused Doug reported [1] the following hung task: INFO: task swapper/0:1 blocked for more than 122 seconds. Not tainted 5.15.149-21875-gf795ebc40eb8 #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:swapper/0 state:D stack: 0 pid: 1 ppid: 0 flags:0x00000008 Call trace: __switch_to+0xf4/0x1f4 __schedule+0x418/0xb80 schedule+0x5c/0x10c rpm_resume+0xe0/0x52c rpm_resume+0x178/0x52c __pm_runtime_resume+0x58/0x98 clk_pm_runtime_get+0x30/0xb0 clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x58/0x208 clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208 clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208 clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208 clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208 clk_disable_unused+0x4c/0xe4 do_one_initcall+0xcc/0x2d8 do_initcall_level+0xa4/0x148 do_initcalls+0x5c/0x9c do_basic_setup+0x24/0x30 kernel_init_freeable+0xec/0x164 kernel_init+0x28/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 INFO: task kworker/u16:0:9 blocked for more than 122 seconds. Not tainted 5.15.149-21875-gf795ebc40eb8 #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/u16:0 state:D stack: 0 pid: 9 ppid: 2 flags:0x00000008 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: __switch_to+0xf4/0x1f4 __schedule+0x418/0xb80 schedule+0x5c/0x10c schedule_preempt_disabled+0x2c/0x48 __mutex_lock+0x238/0x488 __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x1c/0x28 mutex_lock+0x50/0x74 clk_prepare_lock+0x7c/0x9c clk_core_prepare_lock+0x20/0x44 clk_prepare+0x24/0x30 clk_bulk_prepare+0x40/0xb0 mdss_runtime_resume+0x54/0x1c8 pm_generic_runtime_resume+0x30/0x44 __genpd_runtime_resume+0x68/0x7c genpd_runtime_resume+0x108/0x1f4 __rpm_callback+0x84/0x144 rpm_callback+0x30/0x88 rpm_resume+0x1f4/0x52c rpm_resume+0x178/0x52c __pm_runtime_resume+0x58/0x98 __device_attach+0xe0/0x170 device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28 bus_probe_device+0x3c/0x9c device_add+0x644/0x814 mipi_dsi_device_register_full+0xe4/0x170 devm_mipi_dsi_device_register_full+0x28/0x70 ti_sn_bridge_probe+0x1dc/0x2c0 auxiliary_bus_probe+0x4c/0x94 really_probe+0xcc/0x2c8 __driver_probe_device+0xa8/0x130 driver_probe_device+0x48/0x110 __device_attach_driver+0xa4/0xcc bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xd8 __device_attach+0xf8/0x170 device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28 bus_probe_device+0x3c/0x9c deferred_probe_work_func+0x9c/0xd8 process_one_work+0x148/0x518 worker_thread+0x138/0x350 kthread+0x138/0x1e0 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 The first thread is walking the clk tree and calling clk_pm_runtime_get() to power on devices required to read the clk hardware via struct clk_ops::is_enabled(). This thread holds the clk prepare_lock, and is trying to runtime PM resume a device, when it finds that the device is in the process of resuming so the thread schedule()s away waiting for the device to finish resuming before continuing. The second thread is runtime PM resuming the same device, but the runtime resume callback is calling clk_prepare(), trying to grab the prepare_lock waiting on the first thread. This is a classic ABBA deadlock. To properly fix the deadlock, we must never runtime PM resume or suspend a device with the clk prepare_lock held. Actually doing that is near impossible today because the global prepare_lock would have to be dropped in the middle of the tree, the device runtime PM resumed/suspended, and then the prepare_lock grabbed again to ensure consistency of the clk tree topology. If anything changes with the clk tree in the meantime, we've lost and will need to start the operation all over again. Luckily, most of the time we're simply incrementing or decrementing the runtime PM count on an active device, so we don't have the chance to schedule away with the prepare_lock held. Let's fix this immediate problem that can be ---truncated---Thông tin CVE
Điểm yếu liên quan
| Tên điểm yếu | Nguồn | |
|---|---|---|
| Improper Locking The product does not properly acquire or release a lock on a resource, leading to unexpected resource state changes and behaviors. |
Số liệu
| Số liệu | Điểm | Mức độ nghiêm trọng | CVSS Vector | Nguồn |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V3.1 | 5.5 | MEDIUM |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Thêm thông tin
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Local The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities. Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Low Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. Low The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsThe Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. Unchanged An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. None There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. None There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. |
nvd@nist.gov |
EPSS
Điểm EPSS
Phân vị EPSS
Sản phẩm được đề cập
Cấu hình 0
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version Từ (bao gồm) 4.15 Đến (không bao gồm) 5.4.275
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version Từ (bao gồm) 5.5 Đến (không bao gồm) 5.10.216
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version Từ (bao gồm) 5.11 Đến (không bao gồm) 5.15.157
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version Từ (bao gồm) 5.16 Đến (không bao gồm) 6.1.88
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version Từ (bao gồm) 6.2 Đến (không bao gồm) 6.6.29
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version Từ (bao gồm) 6.7 Đến (không bao gồm) 6.8.8
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.9
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.9
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.9
Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version 6.9
Cấu hình 0
Debian>>Debian_linux >> Version 10.0
Cấu hình 0
Fedoraproject>>Fedora >> Version 38
Fedoraproject>>Fedora >> Version 39
Fedoraproject>>Fedora >> Version 40
Tài liệu tham khảo
Tags : Mailing List, Third Party Advisory
Tags : Mailing List, Third Party Advisory
Tags : Mailing List, Third Party Advisory
Tags : Mailing List, Third Party Advisory
