CVE-2024-40979
12h32 +00:00
Mô tả CVE
wifi: ath12k: fix kernel crash during resume
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: fix kernel crash during resume Currently during resume, QMI target memory is not properly handled, resulting in kernel crash in case DMA remap is not supported: BUG: Bad page state in process kworker/u16:54 pfn:36e80 page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x36e80 page dumped because: nonzero _refcount Call Trace: bad_page free_page_is_bad_report __free_pages_ok __free_pages dma_direct_free dma_free_attrs ath12k_qmi_free_target_mem_chunk ath12k_qmi_msg_mem_request_cb The reason is: Once ath12k module is loaded, firmware sends memory request to host. In case DMA remap not supported, ath12k refuses the first request due to failure in allocating with large segment size: ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi firmware request memory request ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 7077888 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 8454144 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi dma allocation failed (7077888 B type 1), will try later with small size ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi delays mem_request 2 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi firmware request memory request Later firmware comes back with more but small segments and allocation succeeds: ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 262144 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 65536 ath12k_pci 0000:04:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 Now ath12k is working. If suspend is triggered, firmware will be reloaded during resume. As same as before, firmware requests two large segments at first. In ath12k_qmi_msg_mem_request_cb() segment count and size are assigned: ab->qmi.mem_seg_count == 2 ab->qmi.target_mem[0].size == 7077888 ab->qmi.target_mem[1].size == 8454144 Then allocation failed like before and ath12k_qmi_free_target_mem_chunk() is called to free all allocated segments. Note the first segment is skipped because its v.addr is cleared due to allocation failure: chunk->v.addr = dma_alloc_coherent() Also note that this leaks that segment because it has not been freed. While freeing the second segment, a size of 8454144 is passed to dma_free_coherent(). However remember that this segment is allocated at the first time firmware is loaded, before suspend. So its real size is 524288, much smaller than 8454144. As a result kernel found we are freeing some memory which is in use and thus cras ---truncated---Thông tin CVE
Điểm yếu liên quan
| Tên điểm yếu | Nguồn | |
|---|---|---|
| Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime The product does not sufficiently track and release allocated memory after it has been used, making the memory unavailable for reallocation and reuse. |
||
| Release of Invalid Pointer or Reference The product attempts to return a memory resource to the system, but it calls the wrong release function or calls the appropriate release function incorrectly. |
Số liệu
| Số liệu | Điểm | Mức độ nghiêm trọng | CVSS Vector | Nguồn |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V3.1 | 7.8 | HIGH |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Thêm thông tin
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Local The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities. Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Low Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. Low The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsThe Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. Unchanged An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. High There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. |
|
| V3.1 | 5.5 | MEDIUM |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Thêm thông tin
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Local The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities. Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Low Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. Low The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsThe Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. Unchanged An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. None There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. None There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. |
nvd@nist.gov |
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Linux>>Linux_kernel >> Version Từ (bao gồm) 6.3 Đến (không bao gồm) 6.9.7
