Tên: Improper Protection against Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EM-FI)

The device is susceptible to electromagnetic fault injection attacks, causing device internal information to be compromised or security mechanisms to be bypassed.

Thông tin chung

Các cách xuất hiện

Architecture and Design
Implementation

Nền tảng áp dụng

Ngôn ngữ

Lớp: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Hệ điều hành

Lớp: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)

Kiến trúc

Lớp: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)

Công nghệ

Lớp: System on Chip (Undetermined)
Tên: Microcontroller Hardware (Undetermined)
Tên: Memory Hardware (Undetermined)
Tên: Power Management Hardware (Undetermined)
Tên: Processor Hardware (Undetermined)
Tên: Test/Debug Hardware (Undetermined)
Tên: Sensor Hardware (Undetermined)

Hậu quả phổ biến

Phạm vi	Tác động	Khả năng xảy ra
Confidentiality Integrity Access Control Availability	Modify Memory, Read Memory, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Ví dụ đã quan sát

Tài liệu tham khảo	Mô tả
CVE-2020-27211	Chain: microcontroller system-on-chip uses a register value stored in flash to set product protection state on the memory bus, but it does not contain protection against fault injection (CWE-1319), which leads to an incorrect initialization of the memory bus (CWE-1419), leading the product to be in an unprotected state.

Các biện pháp giảm thiểu tiềm năng

Phases : Architecture and Design // Implementation

Ghi chú ánh xạ lỗ hổng

Lý do : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Bình luận : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Mẫu tấn công liên quan

ID CAPEC	Tên mẫu tấn công
CAPEC-624	Hardware Fault Injection The adversary uses disruptive signals or events, or alters the physical environment a device operates in, to cause faulty behavior in electronic devices. This can include electromagnetic pulses, laser pulses, clock glitches, ambient temperature extremes, and more. When performed in a controlled manner on devices performing cryptographic operations, this faulty behavior can be exploited to derive secret key information.
CAPEC-625	Mobile Device Fault Injection Fault injection attacks against mobile devices use disruptive signals or events (e.g. electromagnetic pulses, laser pulses, clock glitches, etc.) to cause faulty behavior. When performed in a controlled manner on devices performing cryptographic operations, this faulty behavior can be exploited to derive secret key information. Although this attack usually requires physical control of the mobile device, it is non-destructive, and the device can be used after the attack without any indication that secret keys were compromised.

Ghi chú

This entry is attack-oriented and may require significant modification in future versions, or even deprecation. It is not clear whether there is really a design "mistake" that enables such attacks, so this is not necessarily a weakness and may be more appropriate for CAPEC.

Tài liệu tham khảo

REF-1141

Secure Application Programming in the presence of Side Channel Attacks
Marc Witteman.
https://riscureprodstorage.blob.core.windows.net/production/2017/08/Riscure_Whitepaper_Side_Channel_Patterns.pdf

REF-1142

Injection of transient faults using electromagnetic pulses. Practical results on a cryptographic system
A. Dehbaoui, J. M. Dutertre, B. Robisson, P. Orsatelli, P. Maurine, A. Tria.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/123.pdf

REF-1143

Precise Spatio-Temporal Electromagnetic Fault Injections on Data Transfers
A. Menu, S. Bhasin, J. M. Dutertre, J. B. Rigaud, J. Danger.
https://hal.telecom-paris.fr/hal-02338456/document

REF-1144

BAM BAM!! On Reliability of EMFI for in-situ Automotive ECU Attacks
Colin O'Flynn.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/937.pdf

REF-1145

Design and Validation of a Platform for Electromagnetic Fault Injection
J. Balasch, D. Arumí, S. Manich.
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8311630

REF-1146

Error control scheme for malicious and natural faults in cryptographic modules
M. Gay, B. Karp, O. Keren, I. Polian.
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s13389-020-00234-7.pdf

REF-1147

Automatic Integration of Counter-Measures Against Fault Injection Attacks
M. L. Akkar, L. Goubin, O. Ly.
https://www.labri.fr/perso/ly/publications/cfed.pdf

REF-1285

Physical Security Attacks Against Silicon Devices
Texas Instruments.
https://www.ti.com/lit/an/swra739/swra739.pdf?ts=1644234570420

Gửi

Tên	Tổ chức	Ngày	Ngày phát hành	Version
Sebastien Leger, Rohini Narasipur	Bosch	2020-08-27 +00:00	2020-12-10 +00:00	4.3

Sửa đổi

Tên	Tổ chức	Ngày	Bình luận
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2022-04-28 +00:00	updated Applicable_Platforms
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2022-06-28 +00:00	updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2022-10-13 +00:00	updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2023-01-31 +00:00	updated Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2023-04-27 +00:00	updated References, Relationships
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2023-06-29 +00:00	updated Mapping_Notes
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2023-10-26 +00:00	updated Observed_Examples
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2025-12-11 +00:00	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Weakness_Ordinalities
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2026-10-28 +00:00	updated Common_Consequences, Description, Dimensions, Observed_Examples, References

Chi tiết CWE-1319

CWE-1319