Các cách xuất hiện
Architecture and Design
Nền tảng áp dụng
Ngôn ngữ
Lớp: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Công nghệ
Lớp: Mobile (Undetermined)
Hậu quả phổ biến
| Phạm vi |
Tác động |
Khả năng xảy ra |
| Integrity | Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
Ghi chú: Another application can impersonate the operating system and cause the software to perform an unintended action. | |
Ví dụ đã quan sát
| Tài liệu tham khảo |
Mô tả |
| Mobile app store does not properly verify the intent by the broadcast receiver, allowing local attackers to write arbitrary files |
| Mobile device has an application that exposes a broadcast received that allows local attackers to force a factory reset |
Các biện pháp giảm thiểu tiềm năng
Phases : Architecture and Design
Before acting on the Intent, check the Intent Action to make sure it matches the expected System action.
Phương pháp phát hiện
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Hiệu quả : High
Ghi chú ánh xạ lỗ hổng
Lý do : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Bình luận : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Mẫu tấn công liên quan
| ID CAPEC |
Tên mẫu tấn công |
| CAPEC-499 |
Android Intent Intercept
An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, intercepts messages from a trusted Android-based application in an attempt to achieve a variety of different objectives including denial of service, information disclosure, and data injection. An implicit intent sent from a trusted application can be received by any application that has declared an appropriate intent filter. If the intent is not protected by a permission that the malicious application lacks, then the attacker can gain access to the data contained within the intent. Further, the intent can be either blocked from reaching the intended destination, or modified and potentially forwarded along. |
Ghi chú
This entry will be made more comprehensive in later CWE versions.
Tài liệu tham khảo
REF-922
Analyzing Inter-Application Communication in Android
Erika Chin, Adrienne Porter Felt, Kate Greenwood, David Wagner.
http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/intents-mobisys11.pdf
Gửi
| Tên |
Tổ chức |
Ngày |
Ngày phát hành |
Version |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2013-06-24 +00:00 |
2013-07-17 +00:00 |
2.5 |
Sửa đổi
| Tên |
Tổ chức |
Ngày |
Bình luận |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-02-18 +00:00 |
updated Alternate_Terms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-11-08 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2019-01-03 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-10-13 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Weakness_Ordinalities |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2026-04-30 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2026-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Description |