CAPEC 描述
SIM cards are the de facto trust anchor of mobile devices worldwide. The cards protect the mobile identity of subscribers, associate devices with phone numbers, and increasingly store payment credentials, for example in NFC-enabled phones with mobile wallets. This attack leverages over-the-air (OTA) updates deployed via cryptographically-secured SMS messages to deliver executable code to the SIM. By cracking the DES key, an attacker can send properly signed binary SMS messages to a device, which are treated as Java applets and are executed on the SIM. These applets are allowed to send SMS, change voicemail numbers, and query the phone location, among many other predefined functions. These capabilities alone provide plenty of potential for abuse.
CAPEC 資訊
前置條件
A SIM card that relies on the DES cipher.所需技能
This is a sophisticated attack, but detailed techniques are published in open literature.緩解措施
Upgrade the SIM card to use the state-of-the-art AES or the somewhat outdated 3DES algorithm for OTA.相關弱點
| 弱點名稱 | |
|---|---|
CWE-327 |
Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol. |
參考資料
REF-486
Rooting SIM CardsKarsten Nohl.
https://srlabs.de/rooting-sim-cards/
提交
| 名稱 | 機構 | 日期 | 發布日期 |
|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation |
修改記錄
| 名稱 | 機構 | 日期 | 備註 |
|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences | |
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
