CVE-2026-126626:詳細資料

CVE-2026-126626

5.3
/
中危
2026-11-11
09h17 +00:00
Authorization problems
Network
2026-11-11
09h17 +00:00
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CVE 描述

The web services listener of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.3.3 through 6.3.7 counts every failed CardDAV, CalDAV or Autodiscover sign-in from a proxy it trusts - one on the same machine, or one named in WebServicesTrustedProxies, whose X-Forwarded-Proto it believes - against the proxy's own address, which allows a remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach the proxy to have that address banned from the server's mail listeners. The listener, off by default (WebServicesHttpPort and WebServicesHttpsPort 0), signs an account in with HTTP Basic over HTTPS for CardDAV from 6.3.3 and for CalDAV and Outlook Autodiscover from 6.3.4. Behind a TLS-terminating proxy, which the server trusts when it is on the same machine or named in WebServicesTrustedProxies, the listener takes the client's HTTPS from the proxy's X-Forwarded-Proto header, but it does not believe X-Forwarded-For and sees the proxy's address for every client. Each failed sign-in counted towards the auto-ban against that address, so that failed sign-ins through the proxy from anybody, under any user name, reaching MaxInvalidLogonAttempts (3 within 30 minutes by default) wrote an IP range that refused the proxy's address at the SMTP, POP3, IMAP and ManageSieve listeners for AutoBanMinutes (60 by default), and could write it again each time it lapsed. For a proxy on the same machine that address is the loopback address, so that a webmail on that machine, local scripts that submit mail and the other local clients of the mail listeners were shut out; for a proxy at another address that also carries mail, every mail client behind it was. Such a proxy forwarding to the listener's HTTPS port, re-encrypting, was counted against in the same way, and listing it in WebServicesTrustedProxies did not spare it. The auto-ban is on by default and AutoBanNeverBan, which spares an address, is empty by default; the listener itself went on serving the proxy.

CVE 資訊

相關弱點

CWE-ID 弱點名稱 來源
CWE-645 Overly Restrictive Account Lockout Mechanism
The product contains an account lockout protection mechanism, but the mechanism is too restrictive and can be triggered too easily, which allows attackers to deny service to legitimate users by causing their accounts to be locked out.

指標

指標 評分 嚴重程度 CVSS 向量 來源
V3.1 5.3 MEDIUM CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Base: Exploitabilty Metrics

The Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component.

Attack Vector

This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible.

Network

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).

Attack Complexity

This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Low

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

Privileges Required

This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

None

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

User Interaction

This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component.

None

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

Base: Scope Metrics

The Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Scope

Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs.

Unchanged

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

Base: Impact Metrics

The Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve.

Confidentiality Impact

This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability.

None

There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.

Integrity Impact

This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information.

None

There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.

Availability Impact

This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability.

Low

Performance is reduced or there are interruptions in resource availability. Even if repeated exploitation of the vulnerability is possible, the attacker does not have the ability to completely deny service to legitimate users. The resources in the impacted component are either partially available all of the time, or fully available only some of the time, but overall there is no direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Temporal Metrics

The Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability.

Environmental Metrics

These metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

cve@gitlab.com

參考資料