背景詳情
引入方式
Implementation : Such issues could be introduced during implementation of hardware design, since IP parameters and defaults are defined in HDL code and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
適用平台
程式語言
名稱: Verilog (Undetermined)
名稱: VHDL (Undetermined)
技術
類別: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
常見後果
| 範圍 |
影響 |
可能性 |
Confidentiality Integrity Availability Access Control | Varies by Context
注意:The system security settings of a hardware design can be affected by incorrectly defined default values or IP parameters. The hardware IP would be in an insecure state at power reset, and this can be exposed or exploited by untrusted software running on the system. Degradation of system functionality or loss of access control enforcement can occur. | |
| Other | Reduce Maintainability
注意:Both register defaults and parameters are hardcoded values, which cannot be changed using software or firmware patches but must be changed in hardware silicon. Thus, such security issues are considerably more difficult to address later in the lifecycle. | |
潛在緩解措施
Phases : Architecture and Design
During hardware design, all the system parameters and register defaults must be reviewed to identify security sensitive settings.
Phases : Implementation
The default values of these security sensitive settings need to be defined as part of the design review phase.
偵測方法
Automated Analysis
Use automated tools to test that values are configured per design specifications. Hardware designs can have a large number of such parameters and register defaults settings, and it is important to have design tool support to check these settings in an automated way and be able to identify which settings are security sensitive.
漏洞對應備注
理由說明 : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
備註 : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
相關攻擊模式
| CAPEC ID |
攻擊模式名稱 |
| CAPEC-166 |
Force the System to Reset Values
An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions. |
參考資料
REF-1356
fuse_mem.sv
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/main/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/fuse_mem/fuse_mem.sv#L14-L15 REF-1357
fix CWE 1221 in fuse_mem.sv
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/compare/main...cwe_1221_in_fuse_mem#diff-d7275edeac22f76691a31c83f005d0177359ad710ad6549ece3d069ed043ef21 REF-1437
acct_wrapper.sv
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/65d0ffdab7426da4509c98d62e163bcce642f651/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/acct/acct_wrapper.sv#L39 REF-1438
Bad Code acct_wrapper.sv
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/65d0ffdab7426da4509c98d62e163bcce642f651/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/acct/acct_wrapper.sv#L79C1-L86C16 REF-1439
Good Code acct_wrapper.sv
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/062de4f25002d2dcbdb0a82af36b80a517592612/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/acct/acct_wrapper.sv#L84
提交
| 名稱 |
機構 |
日期 |
發布日期 |
Version |
| Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi |
Intel Corporation |
2019-12-12 +00:00 |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
4.0 |
修改記錄
| 名稱 |
機構 |
日期 |
備註 |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-07-20 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-10-13 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2024-02-29 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2024-07-16 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, Weakness_Ordinalities |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2026-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors |