CWE-1279
Cryptographic Operations are Run Before Supporting Units are Ready
2020-02-24
00h00 +00:00
00h00 +00:00
指定 CWE 通知
掌握特定 CWE 的任何變更。
名稱: Cryptographic Operations are Run Before Supporting Units are Ready
Performing cryptographic operations without ensuring that the supporting inputs are ready to supply valid data may compromise the cryptographic result.
一般資訊
背景詳情
引入方式
Architecture and DesignImplementation : The decision to continue using a cryptographic unit even though the input units to it are not producing valid data will compromise the encrypted result.
適用平台
程式語言
名稱： Verilog (Undetermined)名稱： VHDL (Undetermined)
類別： Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
作業系統
類別： Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)架構
類別： Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)技術
名稱： Processor Hardware (Undetermined)類別： Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
常見後果
| 範圍 | 影響 | 可能性 |
|---|---|---|
| Access Control Confidentiality Integrity Availability Accountability Authentication Authorization Non-Repudiation | Varies by Context |
潛在緩解措施
Phases : Architecture and DesignBest practices should be used to design cryptographic systems. If a cryptographic unit retrieves a private encryption key from a fuse unit, the fuse unit must be up and running before a key may be supplied.
Phases : Implementation
Continuously ensuring that cryptographic inputs are supplying valid information is necessary to ensure that the encrypted output is secure.
漏洞對應備注
理由說明 : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.備註 : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
相關攻擊模式
| CAPEC ID | 攻擊模式名稱 |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-97 | Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis is a process of finding weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms and using these weaknesses to decipher the ciphertext without knowing the secret key (instance deduction). Sometimes the weakness is not in the cryptographic algorithm itself, but rather in how it is applied that makes cryptanalysis successful. An attacker may have other goals as well, such as: Total Break (finding the secret key), Global Deduction (finding a functionally equivalent algorithm for encryption and decryption that does not require knowledge of the secret key), Information Deduction (gaining some information about plaintexts or ciphertexts that was not previously known) and Distinguishing Algorithm (the attacker has the ability to distinguish the output of the encryption (ciphertext) from a random permutation of bits). |
提交
| 名稱 | 機構 | 日期 | 發布日期 | Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi | Intel Corporation | 4.1 |
修改記錄
| 名稱 | 機構 | 日期 | 備註 |
|---|---|---|---|
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Maintenance_Notes | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Weakness_Ordinalities | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Background_Details, Description, Potential_Mitigations |
