名稱: Improper Protection against Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EM-FI)

The device is susceptible to electromagnetic fault injection attacks, causing device internal information to be compromised or security mechanisms to be bypassed.

一般資訊

引入方式

Architecture and Design
Implementation

適用平台

程式語言

類別： Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

作業系統

類別： Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)

架構

類別： Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)

技術

類別： System on Chip (Undetermined)
名稱： Microcontroller Hardware (Undetermined)
名稱： Memory Hardware (Undetermined)
名稱： Power Management Hardware (Undetermined)
名稱： Processor Hardware (Undetermined)
名稱： Test/Debug Hardware (Undetermined)
名稱： Sensor Hardware (Undetermined)

常見後果

範圍	影響	可能性
Confidentiality Integrity Access Control Availability	Modify Memory, Read Memory, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

觀察到的案例

參考資料	描述
CVE-2020-27211	Chain: microcontroller system-on-chip uses a register value stored in flash to set product protection state on the memory bus, but it does not contain protection against fault injection (CWE-1319), which leads to an incorrect initialization of the memory bus (CWE-1419), leading the product to be in an unprotected state.

潛在緩解措施

Phases : Architecture and Design // Implementation

漏洞對應備注

理由說明 : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
備註 : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

備注

This entry is attack-oriented and may require significant modification in future versions, or even deprecation. It is not clear whether there is really a design "mistake" that enables such attacks, so this is not necessarily a weakness and may be more appropriate for CAPEC.

參考資料

REF-1141

Secure Application Programming in the presence of Side Channel Attacks
Marc Witteman.
https://riscureprodstorage.blob.core.windows.net/production/2017/08/Riscure_Whitepaper_Side_Channel_Patterns.pdf

REF-1142

Injection of transient faults using electromagnetic pulses. Practical results on a cryptographic system
A. Dehbaoui, J. M. Dutertre, B. Robisson, P. Orsatelli, P. Maurine, A. Tria.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/123.pdf

REF-1143

Precise Spatio-Temporal Electromagnetic Fault Injections on Data Transfers
A. Menu, S. Bhasin, J. M. Dutertre, J. B. Rigaud, J. Danger.
https://hal.telecom-paris.fr/hal-02338456/document

REF-1144

BAM BAM!! On Reliability of EMFI for in-situ Automotive ECU Attacks
Colin O'Flynn.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/937.pdf

REF-1145

Design and Validation of a Platform for Electromagnetic Fault Injection
J. Balasch, D. Arumí, S. Manich.
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8311630

REF-1146

Error control scheme for malicious and natural faults in cryptographic modules
M. Gay, B. Karp, O. Keren, I. Polian.
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s13389-020-00234-7.pdf

REF-1147

Automatic Integration of Counter-Measures Against Fault Injection Attacks
M. L. Akkar, L. Goubin, O. Ly.
https://www.labri.fr/perso/ly/publications/cfed.pdf

REF-1285

Physical Security Attacks Against Silicon Devices
Texas Instruments.
https://www.ti.com/lit/an/swra739/swra739.pdf?ts=1644234570420

提交

名稱	機構	日期	發布日期	Version
Sebastien Leger, Rohini Narasipur	Bosch	2020-08-27 +00:00	2020-12-10 +00:00	4.3

修改記錄

名稱	機構	日期	備註
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2022-04-28 +00:00	updated Applicable_Platforms
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2022-06-28 +00:00	updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2022-10-13 +00:00	updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2023-01-31 +00:00	updated Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2023-04-27 +00:00	updated References, Relationships
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2023-06-29 +00:00	updated Mapping_Notes
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2023-10-26 +00:00	updated Observed_Examples
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2025-12-11 +00:00	updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Weakness_Ordinalities
CWE Content Team	MITRE	2026-10-28 +00:00	updated Common_Consequences, Description, Dimensions, Observed_Examples, References

CAPEC ID	攻擊模式名稱
CAPEC-624	Hardware Fault Injection The adversary uses disruptive signals or events, or alters the physical environment a device operates in, to cause faulty behavior in electronic devices. This can include electromagnetic pulses, laser pulses, clock glitches, ambient temperature extremes, and more. When performed in a controlled manner on devices performing cryptographic operations, this faulty behavior can be exploited to derive secret key information.
CAPEC-625	Mobile Device Fault Injection Fault injection attacks against mobile devices use disruptive signals or events (e.g. electromagnetic pulses, laser pulses, clock glitches, etc.) to cause faulty behavior. When performed in a controlled manner on devices performing cryptographic operations, this faulty behavior can be exploited to derive secret key information. Although this attack usually requires physical control of the mobile device, it is non-destructive, and the device can be used after the attack without any indication that secret keys were compromised.

CWE-1319 詳細資料

CWE-1319