CWE-1326
Missing Immutable Root of Trust in Hardware
2020-12-10
00h00 +00:00
00h00 +00:00
指定 CWE 通知
掌握特定 CWE 的任何變更。
名稱: Missing Immutable Root of Trust in Hardware
A missing immutable root of trust in the hardware results in the ability to bypass secure boot or execute untrusted or adversarial boot code.
一般資訊
背景詳情
引入方式
Architecture and DesignImplementation : Such issues could be introduced during policy definition, hardware architecture, design, manufacturing, and/or provisioning. They can be identified later during testing or system configuration phases.
適用平台
程式語言
類別： Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)作業系統
類別： Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)架構
類別： Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)技術
名稱： Security Hardware (Undetermined)類別： Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
常見後果
| 範圍 | 影響 | 可能性 |
|---|---|---|
| Authentication Authorization | Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Modify Memory | High |
潛在緩解措施
Phases : Architecture and DesignWhen architecting the system, the RoT should be designated for storage in a memory that does not allow further programming/writes. Note that, for components like ROM, secure patching/update features should be supported to allow authenticated and authorized updates in the field.
Phases : Implementation
During implementation and test, the RoT memory location should be demonstrated to not allow further programming/writes.
偵測方法
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Automated testing can verify that RoT components are immutable.有效性 : High
Architecture or Design Review
Root of trust elements and memory should be part of architecture and design reviews.有效性 : High
漏洞對應備注
理由說明 : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.備註 : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
相關攻擊模式
| CAPEC ID | 攻擊模式名稱 |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-679 | Exploitation of Improperly Configured or Implemented Memory Protections
|
| CAPEC-68 | Subvert Code-signing Facilities
Many languages use code signing facilities to vouch for code's identity and to thus tie code to its assigned privileges within an environment. Subverting this mechanism can be instrumental in an attacker escalating privilege. Any means of subverting the way that a virtual machine enforces code signing classifies for this style of attack. |
參考資料
REF-1152
TCG Roots of Trust SpecificationTrusted Computing Group.
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_Roots_of_Trust_Specification_v0p20_PUBLIC_REVIEW.pdf
REF-1153
Root of Trust Definitions and RequirementsGlobalPlatform Security Task Force.
https://globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GP_RoT_Definitions_and_Requirements_v1.0.1_PublicRelease_CC.pdf
REF-1348
bootrom.svhttps://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac19/blob/619e9fb0ef32ee1e01ad76b8732a156572c65700/bootrom/bootrom.sv#L263C19-L263C19
REF-1349
bootrom.svhttps://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac19/blob/ba6abf58586b2bf4401e9f4d46e3f084c664ff88/bootrom/bootrom.sv#L259C9-L259C9
提交
| 名稱 | 機構 | 日期 | 發布日期 | Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna | Intel Corporation | 4.3 |
修改記錄
| 名稱 | 機構 | 日期 | 備註 |
|---|---|---|---|
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, References | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Weakness_Ordinalities | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Potential_Mitigations |
