背景詳情
引入方式
Architecture and Design
Implementation
適用平台
程式語言
類別: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
作業系統
類別: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)
架構
類別: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)
技術
名稱: Security Hardware (Undetermined)
類別: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
常見後果
| 範圍 |
影響 |
可能性 |
Confidentiality Availability | DoS: Resource Consumption (Other), Varies by Context, Other
注意:Attackers may infer data that belongs to a trusted agent. The methods used to perform this attack may result in noticeably increased resource consumption. | Medium |
觀察到的案例
| 參考資料 |
描述 |
| Improper isolation of shared resource in a network-on-chip leads to denial of service |
潛在緩解措施
Phases : Architecture and Design // Implementation
Implement priority-based arbitration inside the NoC and have dedicated buffers or virtual channels for routing secret data from trusted agents.
偵測方法
Manual Analysis
Providing marker flags to send through the interfaces coupled with examination of which users are able to read or manipulate the flags will help verify that the proper isolation has been achieved and is effective.
有效性 : Moderate
漏洞對應備注
理由說明 : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
備註 : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
相關攻擊模式
| CAPEC ID |
攻擊模式名稱 |
| CAPEC-124 |
Shared Resource Manipulation
An adversary exploits a resource shared between multiple applications, an application pool or hardware pin multiplexing to affect behavior. Resources may be shared between multiple applications or between multiple threads of a single application. Resource sharing is usually accomplished through mutual access to a single memory location or multiplexed hardware pins. If an adversary can manipulate this shared resource (usually by co-opting one of the applications or threads) the other applications or threads using the shared resource will often continue to trust the validity of the compromised shared resource and use it in their calculations. This can result in invalid trust assumptions, corruption of additional data through the normal operations of the other users of the shared resource, or even cause a crash or compromise of the sharing applications. |
參考資料
REF-1155
SurfNoC: A Low Latency and Provably Non-Interfering Approach to Secure Networks-On-Chip
Hassan M. G. Wassel, Ying Gao, Jason K. Oberg, Tedd Huffmire, Ryan Kastner, Frederic T. Chong, Timothy Sherwood.
http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~kastner/papers/isca13-surfNOC.pdf REF-1241
Network on a chip
Wikipedia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_on_a_chip REF-1242
A Survey of Network-on-Chip Security Attacks and Countermeasures
Subodha Charles, Prabhat Mishra.
https://dl.acm.org/doi/fullHtml/10.1145/3450964 REF-1245
Design of Secure and Trustworthy Network-on-chip Architectures
Subodha Charles.
https://www.cise.ufl.edu/research/cad/Publications/charlesThesis.pdf
提交
| 名稱 |
機構 |
日期 |
發布日期 |
Version |
| Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati K. Manna |
Intel Corporation |
2020-05-23 +00:00 |
2020-12-10 +00:00 |
4.3 |
修改記錄
| 名稱 |
機構 |
日期 |
備註 |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Background_Details, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, References, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-04-28 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-06-28 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples |