名稱: Not Failing Securely
When the product encounters an error condition or failure, its design requires it to fall back to a state that is less secure than other options that are available, such as selecting the weakest encryption algorithm or using the most permissive access control restrictions.
一般資訊
引入方式
Architecture and Design : This weakness typically occurs as a result of wanting to "fail functional" to minimize administration and support costs, instead of "failing safe."Implementation
適用平台
程式語言
類別： Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)技術
類別： Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)類別： ICS/OT (Undetermined)
常見後果
| 範圍 | 影響 | 可能性 |
|---|---|---|
| Other | Varies by Context 注意：By entering a less secure state, the product inherits the weaknesses associated with that state, making it easier to compromise. At the least, it causes administrators to have a false sense of security. | |
| Access Control | Bypass Protection Mechanism 注意：Intended access restrictions can be bypassed, which is often contradictory to what the product's administrator expects. |
觀察到的案例
| 參考資料 | 描述 |
|---|---|
CVE-2007-5277 | The failure of connection attempts in a web browser resets DNS pin restrictions. An attacker can then bypass the same origin policy by rebinding a domain name to a different IP address. This was an attempt to "fail functional." |
CVE-2006-4407 | Incorrect prioritization leads to the selection of a weaker cipher. Although it is not known whether this issue occurred in implementation or design, it is feasible that a poorly designed algorithm could be a factor. |
潛在緩解措施
Phases : Architecture and DesignSubdivide and allocate resources and components so that a failure in one part does not affect the entire product.
漏洞對應備注
理由說明 : This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate備註 : Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
備注
Since design issues are hard to fix, they are rarely publicly reported, so there are few CVE examples of this problem as of January 2008. Most publicly reported issues occur as the result of an implementation error instead of design, such as CVE-2005-3177 (Improper handling of large numbers of resources) or CVE-2005-2969 (inadvertently disabling a verification step, leading to selection of a weaker protocol).參考資料
REF-196
The Protection of Information in Computer SystemsJerome H. Saltzer, Michael D. Schroeder.
http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/protection/
REF-522
Failing SecurelySean Barnum, Michael Gegick.
https://web.archive.org/web/20221017053210/https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/failing-securely
提交
| 名稱 | 機構 | 日期 | 發布日期 | Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pascal Meunier | Purdue University | Draft 8 |
修改記錄
| 名稱 | 機構 | 日期 | 備註 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eric Dalci | Cigital | updated Time_of_Introduction | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Description, Name, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description, Name | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Name | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Research_Gaps | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Name |
