CAPEC-606
Weakening of Cellular Encryption
Hoch
Draft
2015-11-09
00h00 +00:00
00h00 +00:00
2018-07-31
00h00 +00:00
00h00 +00:00
Benachrichtigung für ein CAPEC
Bleiben Sie über alle Änderungen zu einem bestimmten CAPEC informiert.
CAPEC-Beschreibungen
An attacker, with control of a Cellular Rogue Base Station or through cooperation with a Malicious Mobile Network Operator can force the mobile device (e.g., the retransmission device) to use no encryption (A5/0 mode) or to use easily breakable encryption (A5/1 or A5/2 mode).
CAPEC-Informationen
Voraussetzungen
Cellular devices that allow negotiating security modes to facilitate backwards compatibility and roaming on legacy networks.Erforderliche Kenntnisse
Adversaries can purchase and implement rogue BTS stations at a cost effective rate, and can push a mobile device to downgrade to a non-secure cellular protocol like 2G over GSM or CDMA.Gegenmaßnahmen
Use of hardened baseband firmware on retransmission device to detect and prevent the use of weak cellular encryption.Monitor cellular RF interface to detect the usage of weaker-than-expected cellular encryption.
Verwandte Schwachstellen
| Name der Schwachstelle | |
|---|---|
CWE-757 |
Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade') A protocol or its implementation supports interaction between multiple actors and allows those actors to negotiate which algorithm should be used as a protection mechanism such as encryption or authentication, but it does not select the strongest algorithm that is available to both parties. |
Einreichung
| Name | Organisation | Datum | Veröffentlichungsdatum |
|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation |
Änderungen
| Name | Organisation | Datum | Kommentar |
|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC Content Team | The MITRE Corporation | Updated Attack_Motivation-Consequences |
