CWE-1299 Details

CWE-1299

Missing Protection Mechanism for Alternate Hardware Interface
Draft
2020-08-20
00h00 +00:00
2025-12-11
00h00 +00:00
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Benachrichtigungen verwalten

Name: Missing Protection Mechanism for Alternate Hardware Interface

The lack of protections on alternate paths to access control-protected assets (such as unprotected shadow registers and other external facing unguarded interfaces) allows an attacker to bypass existing protections to the asset that are only performed against the primary path.

Allgemeine Informationen

Einführungsmodi

Architecture and Design
Implementation

Anwendbare Plattformen

Sprache

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Betriebssysteme

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)

Architekturen

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)

Technologien

Name: Microcontroller Hardware (Undetermined)
Name: Processor Hardware (Undetermined)
Name: Bus/Interface Hardware (Undetermined)
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)

Häufige Konsequenzen

Bereich Auswirkung Wahrscheinlichkeit
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Access Control
Modify Memory, Read Memory, DoS: Resource Consumption (Other), Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Alter Execution Logic, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Quality DegradationHigh

Beobachtete Beispiele

Referenzen Beschreibung

CVE-2022-38399

Missing protection mechanism on serial connection allows for arbitrary OS command execution.

CVE-2020-9285

Mini-PCI Express slot does not restrict direct memory access.

CVE-2020-8004

When the internal flash is protected by blocking access on the Data Bus (DBUS), it can still be indirectly accessed through the Instruction Bus (IBUS).

CVE-2017-18293

When GPIO is protected by blocking access to corresponding GPIO resource registers, protection can be bypassed by writing to the corresponding banked GPIO registers instead.

CVE-2020-15483

monitor device allows access to physical UART debug port without authentication

Mögliche Gegenmaßnahmen

Phases : Requirements
Protect assets from accesses against all potential interfaces and alternate paths.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Protect assets from accesses against all potential interfaces and alternate paths.
Phases : Implementation
Protect assets from accesses against all potential interfaces and alternate paths.

Hinweise zur Schwachstellen-Zuordnung

Begründung : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Kommentar : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Verwandte Angriffsmuster

CAPEC-ID Name des Angriffsmusters
CAPEC-457 USB Memory Attacks
An adversary loads malicious code onto a USB memory stick in order to infect any system which the device is plugged in to. USB drives present a significant security risk for business and government agencies. Given the ability to integrate wireless functionality into a USB stick, it is possible to design malware that not only steals confidential data, but sniffs the network, or monitor keystrokes, and then exfiltrates the stolen data off-site via a Wireless connection. Also, viruses can be transmitted via the USB interface without the specific use of a memory stick. The attacks from USB devices are often of such sophistication that experts conclude they are not the work of single individuals, but suggest state sponsorship. These attacks can be performed by an adversary with direct access to a target system or can be executed via means such as USB Drop Attacks.
CAPEC-554 Functionality Bypass
An adversary attacks a system by bypassing some or all functionality intended to protect it. Often, a system user will think that protection is in place, but the functionality behind those protections has been disabled by the adversary.

Einreichung

Name Organisation Datum Veröffentlichungsdatum Version
Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi Intel Corporation 2019-10-02 +00:00 2020-08-20 +00:00 4.2

Änderungen

Name Organisation Datum Kommentar
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-12-10 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-07-20 +00:00 updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-04-28 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-06-28 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-01-31 +00:00 updated Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-10-26 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2024-02-29 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2025-12-11 +00:00 updated Weakness_Ordinalities