CWE-1303 Details

Hardware structures shared across execution contexts (e.g., caches and branch predictors) can violate the expected architecture isolation between contexts.

Einführungsmodi

Architecture and Design : Such issues could be introduced during hardware architecture and design and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
Implementation : Such issues could be introduced during implementation and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.

Anwendbare Plattformen

Sprache

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Betriebssysteme

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)

Architekturen

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)

Technologien

Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)

Häufige Konsequenzen

Mögliche Gegenmaßnahmen

Phases : Architecture and Design
Microarchitectural covert channels can be addressed using a mixture of hardware and software mitigation techniques. These include partitioned caches, new barrier and flush instructions, and disabling high resolution performance counters and timers.
Phases : Requirements
Microarchitectural covert channels can be addressed using a mixture of hardware and software mitigation techniques. These include partitioned caches, new barrier and flush instructions, and disabling high resolution performance counters and timers.

Hinweise zur Schwachstellen-Zuordnung

Begründung : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Kommentar : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Verwandte Angriffsmuster

Hinweise

As of CWE 4.9, members of the CWE Hardware SIG are closely analyzing this entry and others to improve CWE's coverage of transient execution weaknesses, which include issues related to Spectre, Meltdown, and other attacks. Additional investigation may include other weaknesses related to microarchitectural state. Finally, this entry's demonstrative example might not be appropriate. As a result, this entry might change significantly in CWE 4.10.

Referenzen

REF-1121

Meltdown: Reading Kernel Memory from User Space
Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher, Werner Haas, Anders Fogh, Jann Horn, Stegfan Mangard, Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Yuval Yarom, Mike Hamberg.
https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf

REF-1122

Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher, Werner Haas, Anders Fogh, Jann Horn, Stegfan Mangard, Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Yuval Yarom, Mike Hamberg.
https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf

REF-1123

Jump Over ASLR: Attacking Branch Predictors to Bypass ASLR
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Dmitry Ponomarev, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh.
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7783743/

REF-1124

A Survey of Microarchitectural Timing Attacks and Countermeasures on Contemporary Hardware
Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, David Cock, Gernot Heiser.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/613.pdf

Einreichung

Änderungen