Einführungsmodi
Implementation
Anwendbare Plattformen
Sprache
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Häufige Konsequenzen
| Bereich |
Auswirkung |
Wahrscheinlichkeit |
Confidentiality Integrity Access Control | Read Files or Directories, Modify Files or Directories, Bypass Protection Mechanism
Note: An attacker may be able to traverse the file system to unintended locations and read or overwrite the contents of unexpected files. If the files are used for a security mechanism than an attacker may be able to bypass the mechanism. | |
Beobachtete Beispiele
| Referenzen |
Beschreibung |
| Source code disclosure using trailing dot |
| Source code disclosure using trailing dot |
| Source code disclosure using trailing dot or trailing encoding space "%20" |
| Source code disclosure using trailing dot |
| Bypass directory access restrictions using trailing dot in URL |
| Bypass directory access restrictions using trailing dot in URL |
| Bypass check for ".lnk" extension using ".lnk." |
| Source disclosure via trailing encoded space "%20" |
| Source disclosure via trailing encoded space "%20" |
| Source disclosure via trailing encoded space "%20" |
| Source disclosure via trailing encoded space "%20" |
| Source disclosure via trailing encoded space "%20" |
| Source disclosure via trailing encoded space "%20" |
| Source disclosure via trailing encoded space "%20" |
| Multi-Factor Vulnerability (MFV). directory traversal and other issues in FTP server using Web encodings such as "%20"; certain manipulations have unusual side effects. |
| Trailing space ("+" in query string) leads to source code disclosure. |
| Filenames with spaces allow arbitrary file deletion when the product does not properly quote them; some overlap with path traversal. |
| "+" characters in query string converted to spaces before sensitive file/extension (internal space), leading to bypass of access restrictions to the file. |
| Overlaps infoleak |
| Application server allows remote attackers to read source code for .jsp files by appending a / to the requested URL. |
| Bypass Basic Authentication for files using trailing "/" |
| Read sensitive files with trailing "/" |
| Web server allows remote attackers to view sensitive files under the document root (such as .htpasswd) via a GET request with a trailing /. |
| Directory traversal vulnerability in server allows remote attackers to read protected files via .. (dot dot) sequences in an HTTP request. |
| Read files with full pathname using multiple internal slash. |
| Server allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a GET request with more than one leading / (slash) character in the filename. |
| Server allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via leading slash (//) characters in a URL request. |
| Server allows remote attackers to bypass authentication and read restricted files via an extra / (slash) in the requested URL. |
| Product allows local users to delete arbitrary files or create arbitrary empty files via a target filename with a large number of leading slash (/) characters. |
| Server allows remote attackers to bypass access restrictions for files via an HTTP request with a sequence of multiple / (slash) characters such as http://www.example.com///file/. |
| Product allows remote attackers to bypass authentication, obtain sensitive information, or gain access via a direct request to admin/user.pl preceded by // (double leading slash). |
| Server allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a URL with multiple leading "/" (slash) characters and ".." sequences. |
| Access directory using multiple leading slash. |
| Bypass access restrictions via multiple leading slash, which causes a regular expression to fail. |
| Archive extracts to arbitrary files using multiple leading slash in filenames in the archive. |
| Directory listings in web server using multiple trailing slash |
| web framework for .NET allows remote attackers to bypass authentication for .aspx files in restricted directories via a request containing a (1) "\" (backslash) or (2) "%5C" (encoded backslash) |
| Server allows remote attackers to read source code for executable files by inserting a . (dot) into the URL. |
| Server allows remote attackers to read password-protected files via a /./ in the HTTP request. |
| Possibly (could be a cleansing error) |
| "/./////etc" cleansed to ".///etc" then "/etc" |
| Server allows remote attackers to view password protected files via /./ in the URL. |
| List directories using desired path and "*" |
| List files in web server using "*.ext" |
| Proxy allows remote attackers to bypass denylist restrictions and connect to unauthorized web servers by modifying the requested URL, including (1) a // (double slash), (2) a /SUBDIR/.. where the desired file is in the parentdir, (3) a /./, or (4) URL-encoded characters. |
| application check access for restricted URL before canonicalization |
| CGI source disclosure using "dirname/../cgi-bin" |
| Multiple web servers allow restriction bypass using 8.3 names instead of long names |
| Source code disclosure using 8.3 file name. |
| Multi-Factor Vulnerability. Product generates temporary filenames using long filenames, which become predictable in 8.3 format. |
Mögliche Gegenmaßnahmen
Phases : Implementation
Phases : Implementation
Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.
Phases : Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
Erkennungsmethoden
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
Wirksamkeit : SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
Wirksamkeit : SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
Wirksamkeit : SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
Wirksamkeit : SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
Wirksamkeit : High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
Wirksamkeit : SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
Wirksamkeit : High
Hinweise zur Schwachstellen-Zuordnung
Begründung : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Kommentar : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Verwandte Angriffsmuster
| CAPEC-ID |
Name des Angriffsmusters |
| CAPEC-3 |
Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters
Some APIs will strip certain leading characters from a string of parameters. An adversary can intentionally introduce leading "ghost" characters (extra characters that don't affect the validity of the request at the API layer) that enable the input to pass the filters and therefore process the adversary's input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent semantic way, while the filter does not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms acceptable to the targeted API. |
Hinweise
Some of these manipulations could be effective in path traversal issues, too.
Referenzen
REF-1479
State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation
Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler, Rama S. Moorthy.
https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx
Einreichung
| Name |
Organisation |
Datum |
Veröffentlichungsdatum |
Version |
| PLOVER |
|
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
Draft 3 |
Änderungen
| Name |
Organisation |
Datum |
Kommentar |
| Eric Dalci |
Cigital |
2008-07-01 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-09-08 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Type |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-10-14 +00:00 |
updated Description |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-11-24 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-03-10 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-05-27 +00:00 |
updated Name |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-07-27 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-03-29 +00:00 |
updated Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationship_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-01 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-09-13 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-05-11 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Observed_Examples, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-10-30 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-07-30 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-11-08 +00:00 |
updated Affected_Resources, Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2019-06-20 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-06-25 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Description |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2024-02-29 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-09-09 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, Functional_Areas, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities |