CWE-639 Details

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

Einführungsmodi

Architecture and Design : REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

Anwendbare Plattformen

Sprache

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Häufige Konsequenzen

Beobachtete Beispiele

Mögliche Gegenmaßnahmen

Phases : Architecture and Design
For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
Phases : Architecture and Design // Implementation
Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

Erkennungsmethoden

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Wirksamkeit : High

Hinweise zur Schwachstellen-Zuordnung

Begründung : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Kommentar : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Hinweise

As of CWE 4.20, the relationship between IDOR and BOLA needs to be investigated more closely, including research into how these terms are used in the industry. The CWE team suspects that IDOR can be a part of BOLA, but BOLA expands on the weakness inherent to IDOR in that it is not only about objects that are being directly referenced.

Referenzen

REF-1496

Insecure Direct Object Reference Prevention Cheat Sheet
OWASP.
https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Insecure_Direct_Object_Reference_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html

REF-1497

Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
MDN.
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/IDOR

REF-1498

Insecure Direct Object Reference
Imperva.
https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/insecure-direct-object-reference-idor/

REF-1521

Unraveling Vulnerabilities: Understanding the difference between IDOR, BAC and BOLA
Mateus Pantoja.
https://medium.com/@0ta/unraveling-vulnerabilities-understanding-the-difference-between-idor-bac-and-bola-0bc52cbc6dde

Einreichung

Änderungen