Luồng thực thi
1) Explore
[Determine Target System] In certain cases, the adversary will explore an organization's network to determine a specific target machine to exploit based on the information it contains or privileges the main user may possess.
Kỹ thuật
- If needed, the adversary explores an organization's network to determine if any specific systems of interest exist.
2) Experiment
[Develop or Obtain malware and install on a USB device] The adversary develops or obtains the malicious software necessary to exploit the target system, which they then install on an external USB device such as a USB flash drive.
Kỹ thuật
- The adversary can develop or obtain malware for to perform a variety of tasks such as sniffing network traffic or monitoring keystrokes.
3) Exploit
[Connect or deceive a user into connecting the infected USB device] Once the malware has been placed on an external USB device, the adversary connects the device to the target system or deceives a user into connecting the device to the target system such as in a USB Drop Attack.
Kỹ thuật
- The adversary connects the USB device to a specified target system or performs a USB Drop Attack, hoping a user will find and connect the USB device on their own. Once the device is connected, the malware executes giving the adversary access to network traffic, credentials, etc.
Điều kiện tiên quyết
Some level of physical access to the device being attacked.
Information pertaining to the target organization on how to best execute a USB Drop Attack.
Các biện pháp giảm thiểu
Ensure that proper, physical system access is regulated to prevent an adversary from physically connecting a malicious USB device themself.
Use anti-virus and anti-malware tools which can prevent malware from executing if it finds its way onto a target system. Additionally, make sure these tools are regularly updated to contain up-to-date virus and malware signatures.
Do not connect untrusted USB devices to systems connected on an organizational network. Additionally, use an isolated testing machine to validate untrusted devices and confirm malware does not exist.
Điểm yếu liên quan
| CWE-ID |
Tên điểm yếu |
|
Missing Protection Mechanism for Alternate Hardware Interface The lack of protections on alternate paths to access
control-protected assets (such as unprotected shadow registers
and other external facing unguarded interfaces) allows an
attacker to bypass existing protections to the asset that are
only performed against the primary path. |
Tài liệu tham khảo
REF-379
Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations (2nd Draft)
Jon Boyens, Angela Smith, Nadya Bartol, Kris Winkler, Alex Holbrook, Matthew Fallon.
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-161r1-draft2.pdf
Gửi
| Tên |
Tổ chức |
Ngày |
Ngày phát hành |
| CAPEC Content Team |
The MITRE Corporation |
2014-06-23 +00:00 |
|
Sửa đổi
| Tên |
Tổ chức |
Ngày |
Bình luận |
| CAPEC Content Team |
The MITRE Corporation |
2015-11-09 +00:00 |
Updated Description Summary |
| CAPEC Content Team |
The MITRE Corporation |
2018-07-31 +00:00 |
Updated Attack_Phases, Attack_Prerequisites, Description, Description Summary, Related_Attack_Patterns, Solutions_and_Mitigations, Typical_Likelihood_of_Exploit, Typical_Severity |
| CAPEC Content Team |
The MITRE Corporation |
2020-07-30 +00:00 |
Updated Execution_Flow, Mitigations |
| CAPEC Content Team |
The MITRE Corporation |
2022-09-29 +00:00 |
Updated Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CAPEC Content Team |
The MITRE Corporation |
2023-01-24 +00:00 |
Updated Related_Weaknesses |