Chi tiết CWE-1299

CWE-1299

Missing Protection Mechanism for Alternate Hardware Interface
2020-08-20
00h00 +00:00
Draft
2026-10-28
00h00 +00:00
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Quản lý thông báo

Tên: Missing Protection Mechanism for Alternate Hardware Interface

The lack of protections on alternate paths to access control-protected assets (such as unprotected shadow registers and other external facing unguarded interfaces) allows an attacker to bypass existing protections to the asset that are only performed against the primary path.

Thông tin chung

Các cách xuất hiện

Architecture and Design
Implementation

Nền tảng áp dụng

Ngôn ngữ

Lớp: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Hệ điều hành

Lớp: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)

Kiến trúc

Lớp: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)

Công nghệ

Tên: Microcontroller Hardware (Undetermined)
Tên: Processor Hardware (Undetermined)
Tên: Bus/Interface Hardware (Undetermined)
Lớp: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)

Hậu quả phổ biến

Phạm vi Tác động Khả năng xảy ra
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Access Control
Modify Memory, Read Memory, DoS: Resource Consumption (Other), Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Alter Execution Logic, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Quality DegradationHigh

Ví dụ đã quan sát

Tài liệu tham khảo Mô tả

CVE-2022-38399

Missing protection mechanism on serial connection allows for arbitrary OS command execution.

CVE-2020-9285

Mini-PCI Express slot does not restrict direct memory access.

CVE-2020-8004

When the internal flash is protected by blocking access on the Data Bus (DBUS), it can still be indirectly accessed through the Instruction Bus (IBUS).

CVE-2017-18293

When GPIO is protected by blocking access to corresponding GPIO resource registers, protection can be bypassed by writing to the corresponding banked GPIO registers instead.

CVE-2020-15483

monitor device allows access to physical UART debug port without authentication

Các biện pháp giảm thiểu tiềm năng

Phases : Requirements
Protect assets from accesses against all potential interfaces and alternate paths.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Protect assets from accesses against all potential interfaces and alternate paths.
Phases : Implementation
Protect assets from accesses against all potential interfaces and alternate paths.

Ghi chú ánh xạ lỗ hổng

Lý do : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Bình luận : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Mẫu tấn công liên quan

ID CAPEC Tên mẫu tấn công
CAPEC-457 USB Memory Attacks
An adversary loads malicious code onto a USB memory stick in order to infect any system which the device is plugged in to. USB drives present a significant security risk for business and government agencies. Given the ability to integrate wireless functionality into a USB stick, it is possible to design malware that not only steals confidential data, but sniffs the network, or monitor keystrokes, and then exfiltrates the stolen data off-site via a Wireless connection. Also, viruses can be transmitted via the USB interface without the specific use of a memory stick. The attacks from USB devices are often of such sophistication that experts conclude they are not the work of single individuals, but suggest state sponsorship. These attacks can be performed by an adversary with direct access to a target system or can be executed via means such as USB Drop Attacks.
CAPEC-554 Functionality Bypass
An adversary attacks a system by bypassing some or all functionality intended to protect it. Often, a system user will think that protection is in place, but the functionality behind those protections has been disabled by the adversary.

Gửi

Tên Tổ chức Ngày Ngày phát hành Version
Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi Intel Corporation 2019-10-02 +00:00 2020-08-20 +00:00 4.2

Sửa đổi

Tên Tổ chức Ngày Bình luận
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-12-10 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-07-20 +00:00 updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-04-28 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-06-28 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-01-31 +00:00 updated Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-10-26 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2024-02-29 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2025-12-11 +00:00 updated Weakness_Ordinalities
CWE Content Team MITRE 2026-10-28 +00:00 updated Relationships