CVE-2024-35886
08h34 +00:00
CVE 描述
ipv6: Fix infinite recursion in fib6_dump_done().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: Fix infinite recursion in fib6_dump_done(). syzkaller reported infinite recursive calls of fib6_dump_done() during netlink socket destruction. [1] From the log, syzkaller sent an AF_UNSPEC RTM_GETROUTE message, and then the response was generated. The following recvmmsg() resumed the dump for IPv6, but the first call of inet6_dump_fib() failed at kzalloc() due to the fault injection. [0] 12:01:34 executing program 3: r0 = socket$nl_route(0x10, 0x3, 0x0) sendmsg$nl_route(r0, ... snip ...) recvmmsg(r0, ... snip ...) (fail_nth: 8) Here, fib6_dump_done() was set to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done, and the next call of inet6_dump_fib() set it to nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3]. syzkaller stopped receiving the response halfway through, and finally netlink_sock_destruct() called nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done(). fib6_dump_done() calls fib6_dump_end() and nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() if it is still not NULL. fib6_dump_end() rewrites nlk_sk(sk)->cb.done() by nlk_sk(sk)->cb.args[3], but it has the same function, not NULL, calling itself recursively and hitting the stack guard page. To avoid the issue, let's set the destructor after kzalloc(). [0]: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 CPU: 1 PID: 432110 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.8.0-12821-g537c2e91d354-dirty #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace:CVE 信息
相关弱点
| 弱点名称 | 来源 | |
|---|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Recursion The product does not properly control the amount of recursion that takes place, consuming excessive resources, such as allocated memory or the program stack. |
||
| Out-of-bounds Write The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. |
指标
| 指标 | 评分 | 严重程度 | CVSS 向量 | 来源 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| V3.1 | 7.8 | HIGH |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
更多信息
Base: Exploitabilty MetricsThe Exploitability metrics reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component. Attack Vector This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. Local The vulnerable component is not bound to the network stack and the attacker’s path is via read/write/execute capabilities. Attack Complexity This metric describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Low Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component. Privileges Required This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess before successfully exploiting the vulnerability. Low The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources. User Interaction This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. None The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user. Base: Scope MetricsThe Scope metric captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope. Scope Formally, a security authority is a mechanism (e.g., an application, an operating system, firmware, a sandbox environment) that defines and enforces access control in terms of how certain subjects/actors (e.g., human users, processes) can access certain restricted objects/resources (e.g., files, CPU, memory) in a controlled manner. All the subjects and objects under the jurisdiction of a single security authority are considered to be under one security scope. If a vulnerability in a vulnerable component can affect a component which is in a different security scope than the vulnerable component, a Scope change occurs. Intuitively, whenever the impact of a vulnerability breaches a security/trust boundary and impacts components outside the security scope in which vulnerable component resides, a Scope change occurs. Unchanged An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority. Base: Impact MetricsThe Impact metrics capture the effects of a successfully exploited vulnerability on the component that suffers the worst outcome that is most directly and predictably associated with the attack. Analysts should constrain impacts to a reasonable, final outcome which they are confident an attacker is able to achieve. Confidentiality Impact This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by a software component due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server. Integrity Impact This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. High There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component. Availability Impact This metric measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. High There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable). Temporal MetricsThe Temporal metrics measure the current state of exploit techniques or code availability, the existence of any patches or workarounds, or the confidence in the description of a vulnerability. Environmental MetricsThese metrics enable the analyst to customize the CVSS score depending on the importance of the affected IT asset to a user’s organization, measured in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. |
nvd@nist.gov |
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