引入方式
Architecture and Design
Implementation
适用平台
编程语言
类: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
操作系统
类: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)
架构
类: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)
技术
类: System on Chip (Undetermined)
名称: Microcontroller Hardware (Undetermined)
名称: Memory Hardware (Undetermined)
名称: Power Management Hardware (Undetermined)
名称: Processor Hardware (Undetermined)
名称: Test/Debug Hardware (Undetermined)
名称: Sensor Hardware (Undetermined)
常见后果
| 影响范围 |
影响 |
可能性 |
Confidentiality Integrity Access Control Availability | Modify Memory, Read Memory, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands | |
观察示例
| 参考资料 |
描述 |
| Chain: microcontroller system-on-chip uses a register value stored in flash to set product protection state on the memory bus, but it does not contain protection against fault injection (CWE-1319), which leads to an incorrect initialization of the memory bus (CWE-1419), leading the product to be in an unprotected state. |
潜在缓解措施
Phases : Architecture and Design // Implementation
漏洞映射说明
依据 : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
备注 : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
相关攻击模式
| CAPEC ID |
攻击模式名称 |
| CAPEC-624 |
Hardware Fault Injection
The adversary uses disruptive signals or events, or alters the physical environment a device operates in, to cause faulty behavior in electronic devices. This can include electromagnetic pulses, laser pulses, clock glitches, ambient temperature extremes, and more. When performed in a controlled manner on devices performing cryptographic operations, this faulty behavior can be exploited to derive secret key information. |
| CAPEC-625 |
Mobile Device Fault Injection
Fault injection attacks against mobile devices use disruptive signals or events (e.g. electromagnetic pulses, laser pulses, clock glitches, etc.) to cause faulty behavior. When performed in a controlled manner on devices performing cryptographic operations, this faulty behavior can be exploited to derive secret key information. Although this attack usually requires physical control of the mobile device, it is non-destructive, and the device can be used after the attack without any indication that secret keys were compromised. |
备注
This entry is attack-oriented and may require significant modification in future versions, or even deprecation. It is not clear whether there is really a design "mistake" that enables such attacks, so this is not necessarily a weakness and may be more appropriate for CAPEC.
参考资料
REF-1141
Secure Application Programming in the presence of Side Channel Attacks
Marc Witteman.
https://riscureprodstorage.blob.core.windows.net/production/2017/08/Riscure_Whitepaper_Side_Channel_Patterns.pdf REF-1142
Injection of transient faults using electromagnetic pulses. Practical results on a cryptographic system
A. Dehbaoui, J. M. Dutertre, B. Robisson, P. Orsatelli, P. Maurine, A. Tria.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/123.pdf REF-1143
Precise Spatio-Temporal Electromagnetic Fault Injections on Data Transfers
A. Menu, S. Bhasin, J. M. Dutertre, J. B. Rigaud, J. Danger.
https://hal.telecom-paris.fr/hal-02338456/document REF-1144
BAM BAM!! On Reliability of EMFI for in-situ Automotive ECU Attacks
Colin O'Flynn.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/937.pdf REF-1145
Design and Validation of a Platform for Electromagnetic Fault Injection
J. Balasch, D. Arumí, S. Manich.
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8311630 REF-1146
Error control scheme for malicious and natural faults in cryptographic modules
M. Gay, B. Karp, O. Keren, I. Polian.
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s13389-020-00234-7.pdf REF-1147
Automatic Integration of Counter-Measures Against Fault Injection Attacks
M. L. Akkar, L. Goubin, O. Ly.
https://www.labri.fr/perso/ly/publications/cfed.pdf REF-1285
Physical Security Attacks Against Silicon Devices
Texas Instruments.
https://www.ti.com/lit/an/swra739/swra739.pdf?ts=1644234570420
提交记录
| 名称 |
组织 |
日期 |
发布日期 |
Version |
| Sebastien Leger, Rohini Narasipur |
Bosch |
2020-08-27 +00:00 |
2020-12-10 +00:00 |
4.3 |
修改记录
| 名称 |
组织 |
日期 |
备注 |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-04-28 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-06-28 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-10-13 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Weakness_Ordinalities |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2026-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Dimensions, Observed_Examples, References |