CWE-1319 详情

CWE-1319

Improper Protection against Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EM-FI)
2020-12-10
00h00 +00:00
Incomplete
2026-10-28
00h00 +00:00
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名称: Improper Protection against Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EM-FI)

The device is susceptible to electromagnetic fault injection attacks, causing device internal information to be compromised or security mechanisms to be bypassed.

基本信息

引入方式

Architecture and Design
Implementation

适用平台

编程语言

类: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

操作系统

类: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)

架构

类: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)

技术

类: System on Chip (Undetermined)
名称: Microcontroller Hardware (Undetermined)
名称: Memory Hardware (Undetermined)
名称: Power Management Hardware (Undetermined)
名称: Processor Hardware (Undetermined)
名称: Test/Debug Hardware (Undetermined)
名称: Sensor Hardware (Undetermined)

常见后果

影响范围 影响 可能性
Confidentiality
Integrity
Access Control
Availability
Modify Memory, Read Memory, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

观察示例

参考资料 描述

CVE-2020-27211

Chain: microcontroller system-on-chip uses a register value stored in flash to set product protection state on the memory bus, but it does not contain protection against fault injection (CWE-1319), which leads to an incorrect initialization of the memory bus (CWE-1419), leading the product to be in an unprotected state.

潜在缓解措施

Phases : Architecture and Design // Implementation

漏洞映射说明

依据 : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
备注 : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

相关攻击模式

CAPEC ID 攻击模式名称
CAPEC-624 Hardware Fault Injection
The adversary uses disruptive signals or events, or alters the physical environment a device operates in, to cause faulty behavior in electronic devices. This can include electromagnetic pulses, laser pulses, clock glitches, ambient temperature extremes, and more. When performed in a controlled manner on devices performing cryptographic operations, this faulty behavior can be exploited to derive secret key information.
CAPEC-625 Mobile Device Fault Injection
Fault injection attacks against mobile devices use disruptive signals or events (e.g. electromagnetic pulses, laser pulses, clock glitches, etc.) to cause faulty behavior. When performed in a controlled manner on devices performing cryptographic operations, this faulty behavior can be exploited to derive secret key information. Although this attack usually requires physical control of the mobile device, it is non-destructive, and the device can be used after the attack without any indication that secret keys were compromised.

备注

This entry is attack-oriented and may require significant modification in future versions, or even deprecation. It is not clear whether there is really a design "mistake" that enables such attacks, so this is not necessarily a weakness and may be more appropriate for CAPEC.

参考资料

REF-1141

Secure Application Programming in the presence of Side Channel Attacks
Marc Witteman.
https://riscureprodstorage.blob.core.windows.net/production/2017/08/Riscure_Whitepaper_Side_Channel_Patterns.pdf

REF-1142

Injection of transient faults using electromagnetic pulses. Practical results on a cryptographic system
A. Dehbaoui, J. M. Dutertre, B. Robisson, P. Orsatelli, P. Maurine, A. Tria.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/123.pdf

REF-1143

Precise Spatio-Temporal Electromagnetic Fault Injections on Data Transfers
A. Menu, S. Bhasin, J. M. Dutertre, J. B. Rigaud, J. Danger.
https://hal.telecom-paris.fr/hal-02338456/document

REF-1144

BAM BAM!! On Reliability of EMFI for in-situ Automotive ECU Attacks
Colin O'Flynn.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/937.pdf

REF-1145

Design and Validation of a Platform for Electromagnetic Fault Injection
J. Balasch, D. Arumí, S. Manich.
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8311630

REF-1146

Error control scheme for malicious and natural faults in cryptographic modules
M. Gay, B. Karp, O. Keren, I. Polian.
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s13389-020-00234-7.pdf

REF-1147

Automatic Integration of Counter-Measures Against Fault Injection Attacks
M. L. Akkar, L. Goubin, O. Ly.
https://www.labri.fr/perso/ly/publications/cfed.pdf

REF-1285

Physical Security Attacks Against Silicon Devices
Texas Instruments.
https://www.ti.com/lit/an/swra739/swra739.pdf?ts=1644234570420

提交记录

名称 组织 日期 发布日期 Version
Sebastien Leger, Rohini Narasipur Bosch 2020-08-27 +00:00 2020-12-10 +00:00 4.3

修改记录

名称 组织 日期 备注
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-04-28 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-06-28 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-10-13 +00:00 updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-01-31 +00:00 updated Related_Attack_Patterns
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated References, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-10-26 +00:00 updated Observed_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2025-12-11 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Weakness_Ordinalities
CWE Content Team MITRE 2026-10-28 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences, Description, Dimensions, Observed_Examples, References