引入方式
Implementation
适用平台
编程语言
类: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
常见后果
| 影响范围 |
影响 |
可能性 |
Integrity Confidentiality Availability | Modify Application Data, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands
注意: An attacker could modify the structure of the message or data being sent to the downstream component. When the wrong encoding is used - even if closely related - the downstream component could decode the data incorrectly and misinterpret the output. This can have security consequences when the provided boundaries between control and data are inadvertently broken, because the resulting data could introduce control characters or special elements that were not sent by the product. The resulting data could then be used to bypass protection mechanisms such as input validation, and enable injection attacks. | |
观察示例
| 参考资料 |
描述 |
| Server does not properly handle requests that do not contain UTF-8 data; browser assumes UTF-8, allowing XSS. |
潜在缓解措施
Phases : Implementation
Use context-aware encoding. That is, understand which encoding is being used by the downstream component, and ensure that this encoding is used. If an encoding can be specified, do so, instead of assuming that the default encoding is the same as the default being assumed by the downstream component.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Where possible, use communications protocols or data formats that provide strict boundaries between control and data. If this is not feasible, ensure that the protocols or formats allow the communicating components to explicitly state which encoding/decoding method is being used. Some template frameworks provide built-in support.
Phases : Architecture and Design
检测方法
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
有效性 : High
漏洞映射说明
依据 : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
备注 : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
相关攻击模式
| CAPEC ID |
攻击模式名称 |
| CAPEC-468 |
Generic Cross-Browser Cross-Domain Theft
An attacker makes use of Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) injection to steal data cross domain from the victim's browser. The attack works by abusing the standards relating to loading of CSS: 1. Send cookies on any load of CSS (including cross-domain) 2. When parsing returned CSS ignore all data that does not make sense before a valid CSS descriptor is found by the CSS parser. |
参考资料
REF-786
Injection-safe templating languages
Jim Manico.
https://manicode.blogspot.com/2010/06/injection-safe-templating-languages_30.html REF-787
Can we please stop saying that XSS is boring and easy to fix!
Dinis Cruz.
http://diniscruz.blogspot.com/2010/09/can-we-please-stop-saying-that-xss-is.html REF-788
Canoe: XSS prevention via context-aware output encoding
Ivan Ristic.
https://blog.ivanristic.com/2010/09/introducing-canoe-context-aware-output-encoding-for-xss-prevention.html REF-789
What is the Future of Automated XSS Defense Tools?
Jim Manico.
http://software-security.sans.org/downloads/appsec-2011-files/manico-appsec-future-tools.pdf REF-709
XSS Attacks
Jeremiah Grossman, Robert "RSnake" Hansen, Petko "pdp" D. Petkov, Anton Rager, Seth Fogie.
REF-725
DOM based XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet
OWASP.
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/DOM_based_XSS_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet REF-45
OWASP Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) Project
OWASP.
https://owasp.org/www-project-enterprise-security-api/
提交记录
| 名称 |
组织 |
日期 |
发布日期 |
Version |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-03-24 +00:00 |
2011-03-30 +00:00 |
1.12 |
修改记录
| 名称 |
组织 |
日期 |
备注 |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-01 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-27 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-05-11 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-11-08 +00:00 |
updated References, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2019-01-03 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2019-06-20 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Description |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-09-09 +00:00 |
updated References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2026-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Description |