Modos de introducción
Implementation
Plataformas aplicables
Lenguaje
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Tecnologías
Class: Web Based (Undetermined)
Name: Web Server (Undetermined)
Consecuencias comunes
| Alcance |
Impacto |
Probabilidad |
Integrity Access Control | Modify Application Data, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
Note: CR and LF characters in an HTTP header may give attackers control of the remaining headers and body of the message that the application intends to send/receive, as well as allowing them to create additional messages entirely under their control. | |
Ejemplos observados
| Referencias |
Descripción |
| Chain: Proxy uses a substring search instead of parsing the Transfer-Encoding header (CWE-697), allowing request splitting (CWE-113) and cache poisoning |
| Scala-based HTTP interface allows request splitting and response splitting through header names, header values, status reasons, and URIs |
| Javascript-based framework allows request splitting through a path option of an HTTP request |
| Application accepts CRLF in an object ID, allowing HTTP response splitting. |
| Shopping cart allows HTTP response splitting to perform HTML injection via CRLF in a parameter for a url |
| Bulletin board allows response splitting via CRLF in parameter. |
| Response splitting via CRLF in PHPSESSID. |
| e-commerce app allows HTTP response splitting using CRLF in object id parameters |
Mitigaciones potenciales
Phases : Implementation
Construct HTTP headers very carefully, avoiding the use of non-validated input data.
Phases : Implementation
Phases : Implementation
Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.
Phases : Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
Métodos de detección
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Efectividad : High
Notas de mapeo de vulnerabilidades
Justificación : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comentario : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Patrones de ataque relacionados
| CAPEC-ID |
Nombre del patrón de ataque |
| CAPEC-105 |
HTTP Request Splitting
|
| CAPEC-31 |
Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies
This attack relies on the use of HTTP Cookies to store credentials, state information and other critical data on client systems. There are several different forms of this attack. The first form of this attack involves accessing HTTP Cookies to mine for potentially sensitive data contained therein. The second form involves intercepting this data as it is transmitted from client to server. This intercepted information is then used by the adversary to impersonate the remote user/session. The third form is when the cookie's content is modified by the adversary before it is sent back to the server. Here the adversary seeks to convince the target server to operate on this falsified information. |
| CAPEC-34 |
HTTP Response Splitting
|
| CAPEC-85 |
AJAX Footprinting
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS. |
Referencias
REF-43
OWASP TOP 10
OWASP.
https://github.com/owasp-top/owasp-top-2007 REF-44
24 Deadly Sins of Software Security
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega.
REF-1272
HTTP Request Splitting
Robert Auger.
http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246929/HTTP%20Request%20Splitting
Envío
| Nombre |
Organización |
Fecha |
Fecha de lanzamiento |
Version |
| PLOVER |
|
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
2006-07-19 +00:00 |
Draft 3 |
Modificaciones
| Nombre |
Organización |
Fecha |
Comentario |
| Eric Dalci |
Cigital |
2008-07-01 +00:00 |
updated References, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-09-08 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Observed_Example, Other_Notes, References, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-10-14 +00:00 |
updated Description |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-11-24 +00:00 |
updated Description, Other_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-03-10 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-05-27 +00:00 |
updated Name |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-07-27 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-10-29 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Other_Notes, Theoretical_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2010-02-16 +00:00 |
updated Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2010-06-21 +00:00 |
updated Description, Name |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-03-29 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-01 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Description |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-05-11 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-10-30 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-06-23 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-07-30 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2015-12-07 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-05-03 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-11-08 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2019-06-20 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Type |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-06-25 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-06-28 +00:00 |
Extended the abstraction of this entry to include both HTTP request and response splitting. |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-06-28 +00:00 |
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Theoretical_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-10-13 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Description |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2024-11-19 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities |