CWE-1223
Race Condition for Write-Once Attributes
Incomplete
2020-02-24
00h00 +00:00
00h00 +00:00
2025-12-11
00h00 +00:00
00h00 +00:00
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Nombre: Race Condition for Write-Once Attributes
A write-once register in hardware design is programmable by an untrusted software component earlier than the trusted software component, resulting in a race condition issue.
Informaciones generales
Modos de introducción
Architecture and Design : This weakness can appear in designs that use register write-once attributes with two or more software/firmware modules with varying levels of trust executing in parallel.Plataformas aplicables
Lenguaje
Name: Verilog (Undetermined)Name: VHDL (Undetermined)
Tecnologías
Class: System on Chip (Undetermined)Consecuencias comunes
| Alcance | Impacto | Probabilidad |
|---|---|---|
| Access Control | Bypass Protection Mechanism Note: System configuration cannot be programmed in a secure way. |
Mitigaciones potenciales
Phases : Architecture and DesignDuring hardware design, all register write-once or sticky fields must be evaluated for proper configuration.
Métodos de detección
Automated Analysis
The testing phase should use automated tools to test that values are not reprogrammable and that write-once fields lock on writing zeros.Notas de mapeo de vulnerabilidades
Justificación : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Comentario : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Patrones de ataque relacionados
| CAPEC-ID | Nombre del patrón de ataque |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-26 | Leveraging Race Conditions
The adversary targets a race condition occurring when multiple processes access and manipulate the same resource concurrently, and the outcome of the execution depends on the particular order in which the access takes place. The adversary can leverage a race condition by "running the race", modifying the resource and modifying the normal execution flow. For instance, a race condition can occur while accessing a file: the adversary can trick the system by replacing the original file with their version and cause the system to read the malicious file. |
Envío
| Nombre | Organización | Fecha | Fecha de lanzamiento | Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi | Intel Corporation | 4.0 |
Modificaciones
| Nombre | Organización | Fecha | Comentario |
|---|---|---|---|
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, Weakness_Ordinalities |
