Detalles de contexto
Modos de introducción
Architecture and Design : Such issues could be introduced during hardware architecture and design and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
Implementation : Such issues could be introduced during implementation and identified later during Testing or System Configuration phases.
Plataformas aplicables
Lenguaje
Clase: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Sistemas operativos
Clase: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)
Arquitecturas
Clase: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)
Tecnologías
Clase: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
Consecuencias comunes
| Alcance |
Impacto |
Probabilidad |
| Access Control | Modify Memory
Note: Design or coding errors in
the implementation of the lock bit protection feature
may allow the lock bit to be modified or cleared by
software after it has been set. Attackers might be able to unlock the system and
features that the bit is intended to protect. Registers protected by tje lock bit can be modified even when the lock is set. | High |
Ejemplos observados
| Referencias |
Descripción |
| chip reset clears critical read/write lock permissions for RSA function |
Mitigaciones potenciales
Phases : Architecture and Design // Implementation // Testing
Métodos de detección
Manual Analysis
Set the lock bit. Power cycle the
device. Attempt to clear the lock bit. If the
information is changed, implement a design
fix. Retest. Also, attempt to indirectly clear the lock
bit or bypass it.
Efectividad : High
Notas de mapeo de vulnerabilidades
Justificación : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comentario : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Patrones de ataque relacionados
| CAPEC ID |
Nombre del patrón de ataque |
| CAPEC-680 |
Exploitation of Improperly Controlled Registers
|
Referencias
REF-1350
reglk_wrapper.sv
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/b9ecdf6068445d76d6bee692d163fededf7a9d9b/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/src/reglk/reglk_wrapper.sv#L80C1-L80C48 REF-1351
fix cwe 1199 in reglk
https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/commit/5928add42895b57341ae8fc1f9b8351c35aed865#diff-1c2b09dd092a56e5fb2be431a3849e72ff489d2ae4f4a6bb9c0ea6b7d450135aR80
Envío
| Nombre |
Organización |
Fecha |
Fecha de lanzamiento |
Version |
| Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi |
Intel Corporation |
2020-01-15 +00:00 |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
4.0 |
Modificaciones
| Nombre |
Organización |
Fecha |
Comentario |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-06-25 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-08-20 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-04-28 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-04-03 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-09-09 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2026-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Background_Details, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description |