Detalle CWE-1331

CWE-1331

Improper Isolation of Shared Resources in Network On Chip (NoC)
Stable
2020-12-10
00h00 +00:00
2023-10-26
00h00 +00:00
CWE Mitre.org
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Nombre: Improper Isolation of Shared Resources in Network On Chip (NoC)

The Network On Chip (NoC) does not isolate or incorrectly isolates its on-chip-fabric and internal resources such that they are shared between trusted and untrusted agents, creating timing channels.

Informaciones generales

Detalles de contexto

Modos de introducción

Architecture and Design
Implementation

Plataformas aplicables

Lenguaje

Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)

Sistemas operativos

Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)

Arquitecturas

Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)

Tecnologías

Name: Security Hardware (Undetermined)
Class: Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)

Consecuencias comunes

Alcance Impacto Probabilidad
Confidentiality
Availability		DoS: Resource Consumption (Other), Varies by Context, Other

Note: Attackers may infer data that belongs to a trusted agent. The methods used to perform this attack may result in noticeably increased resource consumption.		Medium

Ejemplos observados

Referencias Descripción

CVE-2021-33096

Improper isolation of shared resource in a network-on-chip leads to denial of service

Mitigaciones potenciales

Phases : Architecture and Design // Implementation
Implement priority-based arbitration inside the NoC and have dedicated buffers or virtual channels for routing secret data from trusted agents.

Métodos de detección

Manual Analysis

Providing marker flags to send through the interfaces coupled with examination of which users are able to read or manipulate the flags will help verify that the proper isolation has been achieved and is effective.
Efectividad : Moderate

Notas de mapeo de vulnerabilidades

Justificación : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comentario : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Patrones de ataque relacionados

CAPEC-ID Nombre del patrón de ataque
CAPEC-124 Shared Resource Manipulation
An adversary exploits a resource shared between multiple applications, an application pool or hardware pin multiplexing to affect behavior. Resources may be shared between multiple applications or between multiple threads of a single application. Resource sharing is usually accomplished through mutual access to a single memory location or multiplexed hardware pins. If an adversary can manipulate this shared resource (usually by co-opting one of the applications or threads) the other applications or threads using the shared resource will often continue to trust the validity of the compromised shared resource and use it in their calculations. This can result in invalid trust assumptions, corruption of additional data through the normal operations of the other users of the shared resource, or even cause a crash or compromise of the sharing applications.

Referencias

REF-1155

SurfNoC: A Low Latency and Provably Non-Interfering Approach to Secure Networks-On-Chip
Hassan M. G. Wassel, Ying Gao, Jason K. Oberg, Tedd Huffmire, Ryan Kastner, Frederic T. Chong, Timothy Sherwood.
http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~kastner/papers/isca13-surfNOC.pdf

REF-1241

Network on a chip
Wikipedia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_on_a_chip

REF-1242

A Survey of Network-on-Chip Security Attacks and Countermeasures
Subodha Charles, Prabhat Mishra.
https://dl.acm.org/doi/fullHtml/10.1145/3450964

REF-1245

Design of Secure and Trustworthy Network-on-chip Architectures
Subodha Charles.
https://www.cise.ufl.edu/research/cad/Publications/charlesThesis.pdf

Envío

Nombre Organización Fecha Fecha de lanzamiento Version
Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati K. Manna Intel Corporation 2020-05-23 +00:00 2020-12-10 +00:00 4.3

Modificaciones

Nombre Organización Fecha Comentario
CWE Content Team MITRE 2021-10-28 +00:00 updated Background_Details, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, References, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-04-28 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2022-06-28 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-10-26 +00:00 updated Observed_Examples
La información presentada en CVE Find proviene de varias fuentes de referencia cuidadosamente seleccionadas. Los datos CVE son proporcionados por MITRE Corporation y la Base de Datos Nacional de Vulnerabilidades (NVD). El catálogo de Vulnerabilidades Explotadas Conocidas (KEV) proviene de la Agencia de Seguridad de Infraestructura y Ciberseguridad (CISA), mientras que las puntuaciones EPSS provienen de FIRST.org. Además, los datos sobre debilidades de software (CWE) y patrones de ataque comunes (CAPEC) son mantenidos por MITRE Corporation, y la información sobre configuraciones de hardware y software (CPE) es proporcionada por la NVD.