Detalle CWE-243

CWE-243

Creation of chroot Jail Without Changing Working Directory
Alto
Draft
2006-07-19
00h00 +00:00
2023-06-29
00h00 +00:00
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Nombre: Creation of chroot Jail Without Changing Working Directory

The product uses the chroot() system call to create a jail, but does not change the working directory afterward. This does not prevent access to files outside of the jail.

Descripción CWE

Improper use of chroot() may allow attackers to escape from the chroot jail. The chroot() function call does not change the process's current working directory, so relative paths may still refer to file system resources outside of the chroot jail after chroot() has been called.

Informaciones generales

Detalles de contexto

Modos de introducción

Implementation : REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

Plataformas aplicables

Lenguaje

Name: C (Undetermined)
Name: C++ (Undetermined)

Sistemas operativos

Class: Unix (Undetermined)

Consecuencias comunes

Alcance Impacto Probabilidad
ConfidentialityRead Files or Directories

Métodos de detección

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Efectividad : High

Notas de mapeo de vulnerabilidades

Justificación : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Comentario : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Referencias

REF-6

Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors
Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess, Gary McGraw.
https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf

Envío

Nombre Organización Fecha Fecha de lanzamiento Version
7 Pernicious Kingdoms 2006-07-19 +00:00 2006-07-19 +00:00 Draft 3

Modificaciones

Nombre Organización Fecha Comentario
CWE Content Team MITRE 2008-09-08 +00:00 updated Applicable_Platforms, Background_Details, Description, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
CWE Content Team MITRE 2008-10-14 +00:00 updated Description
CWE Content Team MITRE 2009-03-10 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2009-05-27 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples
CWE Content Team MITRE 2010-12-13 +00:00 updated Demonstrative_Examples, Name
CWE Content Team MITRE 2011-06-01 +00:00 updated Common_Consequences
CWE Content Team MITRE 2012-05-11 +00:00 updated Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2014-07-30 +00:00 updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
CWE Content Team MITRE 2017-11-08 +00:00 updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2020-02-24 +00:00 updated References
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-01-31 +00:00 updated Description
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-04-27 +00:00 updated Detection_Factors, Relationships
CWE Content Team MITRE 2023-06-29 +00:00 updated Mapping_Notes