Modos de introducción
Architecture and Design : OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Implementation
Plataformas aplicables
Lenguaje
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Tecnologías
Name: Web Server (Often)
Consecuencias comunes
| Alcance |
Impacto |
Probabilidad |
| Access Control | Bypass Protection Mechanism, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
Note: An attacker could potentially modify the state in malicious ways. If the state is related to the privileges or level of authentication that the user has, then state modification might allow the user to bypass authentication or elevate privileges. | |
| Confidentiality | Read Application Data
Note: The state variables may contain sensitive information that should not be known by the client. | |
| Availability | DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart
Note: By modifying state variables, the attacker could violate the application's expectations for the contents of the state, leading to a denial of service due to an unexpected error condition. | |
Ejemplos observados
| Referencias |
Descripción |
| Mail client stores password hashes for unrelated accounts in a hidden form field. |
| Privileged program trusts user-specified environment variable to modify critical configuration settings. |
| Telnet daemon allows remote clients to specify critical environment variables for the server, leading to code execution. |
| Untrusted search path vulnerability through modified LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable. |
| Untrusted search path vulnerability through modified LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable. |
| Calendar application allows bypass of authentication by setting a certain cookie value to 1. |
| Setting of a language preference in a cookie enables path traversal attack. |
| Application allows admin privileges by setting a cookie value to "admin." |
| Application allows admin privileges by setting a cookie value to "admin." |
| Application allows admin privileges by setting a cookie value to "admin." |
| Shopping cart allows price modification via hidden form field. |
| Shopping cart allows price modification via hidden form field. |
| Server allows client to specify the search path, which can be modified to point to a program that the client has uploaded. |
Mitigaciones potenciales
Phases : Architecture and Design
Understand all the potential locations that are accessible to attackers. For example, some programmers assume that cookies and hidden form fields cannot be modified by an attacker, or they may not consider that environment variables can be modified before a privileged program is invoked.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Phases : Architecture and Design
Store state information on the server side only. Ensure that the system definitively and unambiguously keeps track of its own state and user state and has rules defined for legitimate state transitions. Do not allow any application user to affect state directly in any way other than through legitimate actions leading to state transitions.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Phases : Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Phases : Operation // Implementation
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Phases : Testing
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
Métodos de detección
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Efectividad : High
Fuzzing
Use dynamic tools and techniques that
interact with the product using large test suites with
many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing),
robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's
operation may slow down, but it should not become
unstable, crash, or generate incorrect
results.
Notas de mapeo de vulnerabilidades
Justificación : This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate
Comentario : Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
Patrones de ataque relacionados
| CAPEC-ID |
Nombre del patrón de ataque |
| CAPEC-21 |
Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers
|
| CAPEC-31 |
Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies
This attack relies on the use of HTTP Cookies to store credentials, state information and other critical data on client systems. There are several different forms of this attack. The first form of this attack involves accessing HTTP Cookies to mine for potentially sensitive data contained therein. The second form involves intercepting this data as it is transmitted from client to server. This intercepted information is then used by the adversary to impersonate the remote user/session. The third form is when the cookie's content is modified by the adversary before it is sent back to the server. Here the adversary seeks to convince the target server to operate on this falsified information. |
Referencias
REF-528
Top 10 2007-Insecure Direct Object Reference
OWASP.
https://web.archive.org/web/20160319225940/http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2007-A4 REF-529
HMAC
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAC REF-44
24 Deadly Sins of Software Security
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, John Viega.
REF-1482
D3FEND: D3-TL Trusted Library
D3FEND.
https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:TrustedLibrary/
Envío
| Nombre |
Organización |
Fecha |
Fecha de lanzamiento |
Version |
| Evgeny Lebanidze |
Cigital |
2008-01-30 +00:00 |
2008-01-30 +00:00 |
Draft 8 |
Modificaciones
| Nombre |
Organización |
Fecha |
Comentario |
| Sean Eidemiller |
Cigital |
2008-07-01 +00:00 |
added/updated demonstrative examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-09-08 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2008-10-14 +00:00 |
updated Description |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-01-12 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Type |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-03-10 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-07-27 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2010-02-16 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2010-06-21 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2011-06-01 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-05-11 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2012-10-30 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-02-18 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2014-07-30 +00:00 |
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-01-19 +00:00 |
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-11-08 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Enabling_Factors_for_Exploitation, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-06-25 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-03-15 +00:00 |
updated Demonstrative_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-09-09 +00:00 |
updated Potential_Mitigations, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities |