Modes d'introduction
Array :
It is common practice for products to be designed to
use default keys, passwords, or other mechanisms for
authentication. The rationale is to simplify the
manufacturing process or the system administrator's
task of installation and deployment into an
enterprise. However, this places the responsibility of
changing defaults onto the administrator.
Plateformes applicables
Langue
Classe : Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)
Systèmes d’exploitation
Classe : Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)
Architectures
Classe : Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)
Technologies
Classe : ICS/OT (Undetermined)
Classe : Not Technology-Specific (Undetermined)
Conséquences courantes
| Portée |
Impact |
Probabilité |
| Authentication | Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
Note : If admins do not change the defaults, it is easier for
attackers to bypass authentication quickly across multiple
organizations. | |
Exemples observés
| Références |
Description |
| Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) uses default credentials for some SSH accounts |
| data visualization/sharing package uses default secret keys or cookie values if they are not specified in environment variables |
| microcontroller board has default password, allowing admin access |
| cloud cluster management product has a default master encryption key |
| Intrusion Detection System (IDS) uses the same static, private SSL keys for multiple devices and installations, allowing decryption of SSL traffic |
Mesures d’atténuation potentielles
Phases : Requirements
Prohibit use of default, hard-coded, or other values that do not vary for each installation of the product - especially for separate organizations.
Phases : Architecture and Design
Force the administrator to change the credential upon installation.
Phases : Installation // Operation
The product administrator could change the defaults upon installation or during operation.
Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Références
REF-1283
OT:ICEFALL: The legacy of "insecure by design" and its implications for certifications and risk management
Forescout Vedere Labs.
https://www.forescout.com/resources/ot-icefall-report/
Soumission
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Date de publication |
Version |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2022-10-07 +00:00 |
2022-10-13 +00:00 |
4.9 |
Modifications
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Commentaire |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2024-11-19 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2026-10-28 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Time_of_Introduction |