CWE-291
Reliance on IP Address for Authentication
2006-07-19
00h00 +00:00
00h00 +00:00
Notifications pour un CWE
Restez informé de toutes modifications pour un CWE spécifique.
Nom: Reliance on IP Address for Authentication
The product uses an IP address for authentication.
Informations générales
Modes d'introduction
Architecture and Design : COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.Plateformes applicables
Langue
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)Conséquences courantes
| Portée | Impact | Probabilité |
|---|---|---|
| Access Control Non-Repudiation | Hide Activities, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity |
Exemples observés
| Références | Description |
|---|---|
CVE-2022-30319 | S-bus functionality in a home automation product performs access control using an IP allowlist, which can be bypassed by a forged IP address. |
Mesures d’atténuation potentielles
Phases : Architecture and DesignUse other means of identity verification that cannot be simply spoofed. Possibilities include a username/password or certificate. While IP address verification can be a useful part of an authentication scheme, but it should not be the single factor required for authentication.
Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Modèles d'attaque associés
| CAPEC-ID | Nom du modèle d'attaque |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-4 | Using Alternative IP Address Encodings
This attack relies on the adversary using unexpected formats for representing IP addresses. Networked applications may expect network location information in a specific format, such as fully qualified domains names (FQDNs), URL, IP address, or IP Address ranges. If the location information is not validated against a variety of different possible encodings and formats, the adversary can use an alternate format to bypass application access control. |
Références
REF-18
The CLASP Application Security ProcessSecure Software, Inc..
https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/TheCLASPApplicationSecurityProcess.pdf
REF-1371
IP address spoofinghttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_address_spoofing
Soumission
| Nom | Organisation | Date | Date de publication | Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CLASP | Draft 3 |
Modifications
| Nom | Organisation | Date | Commentaire |
|---|---|---|---|
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description, Other_Notes | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | Changed type from composite to weakness. | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Name, Relationships, Type | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Description | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Observed_Examples, References | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Common_Consequences, Description, Potential_Mitigations |
