Modes d'introduction
Architecture and Design
Implementation : REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
Plateformes applicables
Langue
Name: C (Often)
Name: C++ (Often)
Systèmes d’exploitation
Class: Unix (Undetermined)
Class: Windows (Undetermined)
Conséquences courantes
| Portée |
Impact |
Probabilité |
Integrity Availability Confidentiality | Varies by Context
Note: Attackers can invoke any functionality that the IOCTL offers. Depending on the functionality, the consequences may include code execution, denial-of-service, and theft of data. | |
Exemples observés
| Références |
Description |
| Operating system does not enforce permissions on an IOCTL that can be used to modify network settings. |
| Device driver does not restrict ioctl calls to its direct rendering manager. |
| ioctl does not check for a required capability before processing certain requests. |
| Chain: insecure device permissions allows access to an IOCTL, allowing arbitrary memory to be overwritten. |
| Chain: anti-virus product uses weak permissions for a device, leading to resultant buffer overflow in an exposed IOCTL. |
| Chain: sandbox allows opening of a TTY device, enabling shell commands through an exposed ioctl. |
| Anti-virus product uses insecure security descriptor for a device driver, allowing access to a privileged IOCTL. |
| Unauthorized user can disable keyboard or mouse by directly invoking a privileged IOCTL. |
Mesures d’atténuation potentielles
Phases : Architecture and Design
In Windows environments, use proper access control for the associated device or device namespace. See References.
Notes de cartographie des vulnérabilités
Justification : This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Commentaire : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Notes
This can be primary to many other weaknesses when the programmer assumes that the IOCTL can only be accessed by trusted parties. For example, a program or driver might not validate incoming addresses in METHOD_NEITHER IOCTLs in Windows environments (CWE-781), which could allow buffer overflow and similar attacks to take place, even when the attacker never should have been able to access the IOCTL at all.
Références
REF-701
Securing Device Objects
Microsoft.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/kernel/controlling-device-access
Soumission
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Date de publication |
Version |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-07-15 +00:00 |
2009-07-27 +00:00 |
1.5 |
Modifications
| Nom |
Organisation |
Date |
Commentaire |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2009-12-28 +00:00 |
updated Time_of_Introduction |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2017-11-08 +00:00 |
updated Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2020-02-24 +00:00 |
updated Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2021-03-15 +00:00 |
updated Observed_Examples |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-01-31 +00:00 |
updated Description |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-04-27 +00:00 |
updated References, Relationships |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-06-29 +00:00 |
updated Mapping_Notes |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2023-10-26 +00:00 |
updated Common_Consequences |
| CWE Content Team |
MITRE |
2025-12-11 +00:00 |
updated Weakness_Ordinalities |