CWE-1319
Improper Protection against Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EM-FI)
Incomplete
2020-12-10
00h00 +00:00
00h00 +00:00
2025-12-11
00h00 +00:00
00h00 +00:00
Meldingen voor een CWE
Blijf op de hoogte van wijzigingen voor een specifieke CWE.
Naam: Improper Protection against Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EM-FI)
The device is susceptible to electromagnetic fault injection attacks, causing device internal information to be compromised or security mechanisms to be bypassed.
Algemene informatie
Introductiemodi
Architecture and DesignImplementation
Toepasselijke platforms
Taal
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined)Besturingssystemen
Class: Not OS-Specific (Undetermined)Architecturen
Class: Not Architecture-Specific (Undetermined)Technologieën
Class: System on Chip (Undetermined)Name: Microcontroller Hardware (Undetermined)
Name: Memory Hardware (Undetermined)
Name: Power Management Hardware (Undetermined)
Name: Processor Hardware (Undetermined)
Name: Test/Debug Hardware (Undetermined)
Name: Sensor Hardware (Undetermined)
Veelvoorkomende gevolgen
| Bereik | Impact | Waarschijnlijkheid |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality Integrity Access Control Availability | Modify Memory, Read Memory, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands |
Waargenomen voorbeelden
| Referenties | Beschrijving |
|---|---|
CVE-2020-27211 | Chain: microcontroller system-on-chip uses a register value stored in flash to set product protection state on the memory bus and does not contain protection against fault injection (CWE-1319) which leads to an incorrect initialization of the memory bus (CWE-1419) leading the product to be in an unprotected state. |
Mogelijke risicobeperkingen
Phases : Architecture and Design // ImplementationNotities kwetsbaarheidsmapping
Rechtvaardiging : This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.Opmerking : Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Gerelateerde aanvalspatronen
| CAPEC-ID | Naam aanvalspatroon |
|---|---|
| CAPEC-624 | Hardware Fault Injection
The adversary uses disruptive signals or events, or alters the physical environment a device operates in, to cause faulty behavior in electronic devices. This can include electromagnetic pulses, laser pulses, clock glitches, ambient temperature extremes, and more. When performed in a controlled manner on devices performing cryptographic operations, this faulty behavior can be exploited to derive secret key information. |
| CAPEC-625 | Mobile Device Fault Injection
Fault injection attacks against mobile devices use disruptive signals or events (e.g. electromagnetic pulses, laser pulses, clock glitches, etc.) to cause faulty behavior. When performed in a controlled manner on devices performing cryptographic operations, this faulty behavior can be exploited to derive secret key information. Although this attack usually requires physical control of the mobile device, it is non-destructive, and the device can be used after the attack without any indication that secret keys were compromised. |
Notities
This entry is attack-oriented and may require significant modification in future versions, or even deprecation. It is not clear whether there is really a design "mistake" that enables such attacks, so this is not necessarily a weakness and may be more appropriate for CAPEC.Referenties
REF-1141
Secure Application Programming in the presence of Side Channel AttacksMarc Witteman.
https://riscureprodstorage.blob.core.windows.net/production/2017/08/Riscure_Whitepaper_Side_Channel_Patterns.pdf
REF-1142
Injection of transient faults using electromagnetic pulses. Practical results on a cryptographic systemA. Dehbaoui, J. M. Dutertre, B. Robisson, P. Orsatelli, P. Maurine, A. Tria.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/123.pdf
REF-1143
Precise Spatio-Temporal Electromagnetic Fault Injections on Data TransfersA. Menu, S. Bhasin, J. M. Dutertre, J. B. Rigaud, J. Danger.
https://hal.telecom-paris.fr/hal-02338456/document
REF-1144
BAM BAM!! On Reliability of EMFI for in-situ Automotive ECU AttacksColin O'Flynn.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/937.pdf
REF-1145
Design and Validation of a Platform for Electromagnetic Fault InjectionJ. Balasch, D. Arumí, S. Manich.
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8311630
REF-1146
Error control scheme for malicious and natural faults in cryptographic modulesM. Gay, B. Karp, O. Keren, I. Polian.
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s13389-020-00234-7.pdf
REF-1147
Automatic Integration of Counter-Measures Against Fault Injection AttacksM. L. Akkar, L. Goubin, O. Ly.
https://www.labri.fr/perso/ly/publications/cfed.pdf
REF-1285
Physical Security Attacks Against Silicon DevicesTexas Instruments.
https://www.ti.com/lit/an/swra739/swra739.pdf?ts=1644234570420
Indiening
| Naam | Organisatie | Datum | Releasedatum | Version |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sebastien Leger, Rohini Narasipur | Bosch | 4.3 |
Wijzigingen
| Naam | Organisatie | Datum | Opmerking |
|---|---|---|---|
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Related_Attack_Patterns | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated References, Relationships | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Mapping_Notes | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Observed_Examples | |
| CWE Content Team | MITRE | updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, Weakness_Ordinalities |
